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Construct truncation can be defined as the failure to capture variation along the entire 
continuum of a construct reliably. It can occur due to suboptimal person selection or due to 
suboptimal item selection.  In this thesis, I used a series of simulation studies coupled with 
real data examples to characterise the consequences of construct truncation on the inferences 
made in empirical research. The analyses suggested that construct truncation has the potential 
to result in significant distortions of substantive conclusions.  Based on these analyses I 
developed recommendations for anticipating the circumstances under which construct 
truncation is likely to be problematic, identifying it when it occurs, and mitigating its adverse 
effects on  substantive conclusions drawn from affected data. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Empirical research in the social sciences typically involves drawing a sample of participants 
from some target population, measuring constructs of interest in that sample, and conducting 
statistical tests on the resulting data. For inferences to the target population to be valid, it is 
assumed that the sample is representative of the target population in all relevant respects, 
including that the constructs of interest as they exist in that target population have been 
successfully represented by the questionnaires, tests, or measures administered. In the current 
thesis, I discuss a specific and common way in which this assumption is violated and the 
consequences that this has for theoretical inferences made under these circumstances: I 
discuss the problem of construct truncation due to inadequate item or person sampling. 
Defining construct truncation 
 For the purposes of this thesis I define construct truncation as under-representation of 
the more extreme levels of a construct. Construct truncation can occur due to inadequate 
person or item sampling, sometimes these are referred to as ‘type 1’ and ‘type 2’ sampling 
respectively (Revelle & Zinbarg, 2009).  In the case of truncation due to person sampling, 
individuals with the highest and/or lowest levels of the construct of interest are under-
represented in the sample. In the case of truncation due to item sampling, a questionnaire 
does not include items capable of providing reliable measures of the highest and/or lowest 
levels of the construct of interest.  
 How common is construct truncation due to person sampling? 
 Construct truncation due to inadequate person sampling is prevalent in fields that rely 
on human participants such as psychology, epidemiology, and sociology. It occurs in spite of 
the best intentions of researchers because human participants are agents who cannot be 
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passively and randomly sampled, but, rather, take active parts in self-selecting into and out of 
research studies. This self-selection becomes problematic when related to the same constructs 
that are of interest in a study. It is has been observed, for example, that it is those individuals 
of the poorest health (Volken, 2013), lowest cognitive ability (Nishiwaki, Clark, Morton, & 
Leon, 2005), least conscientious and most neurotic personalities (Lönnqvist et al., 2007), or 
lowest and highest incomes (Bobko, Roth, & Bobko, 2001) who are most likely to decline to 
participate in research studies involving these respective constructs. In these instances, 
construct truncation can occur to varying degrees, depending on the extent to which 
individuals with the highest and/or lowest levels of that construct are under-represented in the 
sample. Evidence for the commonality of construct truncation comes from comparisons of 
research samples against population norms (Etter & Perneger, 1997), of respondents against 
non-respondents where information on the latter is available (e.g. Hill, Roberts, Ewings, & 
Gunnell, 1997), and of first assessments of participants who return to complete a follow-up 
study against those who drop out (Dollinger & Leong, 1993; Mein et al., 2012). To illustrate 
how widespread construct truncation due to person sampling is, possible examples across 
diverse research domains are outlined in Table 1.1. These are just a few examples, with 
others easily found in the literature. Unfortunately, it is difficult to characterise the overall 
scale of the problem because most selection is subtle and driven by forces not explicitly 
measured (Hunter, Schmidt, & Le, 2006). Furthermore, the population distribution of a 
construct is seldom known, making it difficult to ascertain whether and to what extent 
truncation has occurred in a given instance (Vink et al., 2004). 
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Table 1.1: Some examples of construct truncation due to person sampling 
Construct Nature of construct truncation Possible implications 
Family 
environment 
Stoolmiller (1998) claimed that, due to selection procedures 
by adoption agencies, only the highest-quality family 
environments are represented in adoption studies.  
The effects of family environments on various outcomes 
may be under-estimated in adoption studies because only 
the higher-quality family environments are represented 
Disease risk Miller (1994) noted that many studies of the association 
between type A behaviour and heart disease used only 
participants showing high levels of type A behaviour. 
The relation between type A behaviour and heart disease 





Murray, McKenzie, and Murray (2014) noted that studies 
attempting to estimate the association between adaptive 
functioning and intellectual ability have tended to use 
individuals with clinical diagnoses of intellectual disability. 
The correlation between adaptive skills and intellectual 
ability may be under-estimated due to restricted range of 
intellectual ability because this diagnosis is made only 
when a client has an IQ<70. 
Job selection 
tests 
Schmidt, Shaffer & Oh (2008), LeBreton, Burgess, Kaiser, & 
Atchley (2003) and Sackett, Laczo, and Arvey (2002)   
discussed how job performance data on successful applicants 
is sometimes used to estimate the predictive validity of the 
selection tests and inter-rater reliability of job performance. 
The predictive validity of selection tests and the inter-rater 
reliability of job performance are likely to be under-
estimated when based on successful candidates alone. 
Anti-social 
behaviour 
Taylor (2004) found that twin families who showed higher 
levels of parental and child antisocial behaviour were less 
likely to respond to a mail survey. 
Estimates of additive genetic variance and unshared 
environmental variance were inflated while estimates of 
shared environmental variance were attenuated.  
Cognitive ageing Deary, Gow, Pattie, & Starr (2012) demonstrated that two 
cohorts used to study cognitive ageing had higher means but 
smaller variances in IQ than the population from which they 
were sampled. Baseline cognitive ability also proved to be an 
important predictor of drop-out. 
The effects of cognitive ability on later life outcomes and 




Heath, Madden & Marten (1998) found that participants in an 
alcohol challenge study had higher average alcohol 
consumption levels than the population from which they were 
drawn. 
Individuals who would feel very intoxicated following an 
alcohol challenge were under-represented meaning that the 




Construct truncation can also occur due to inadequate item sampling. A key goal of 
item selection is to include items that represent the full breadth of both content areas and 
levels of a trait (e.g. Diamantopoulos & Winkhofler, 2001; Murray, Eisner & Ribeaud, 2015). 
Both are important elements in the representativeness of items and in turn ecological validity; 
however, it is inadequate sampling with respect to the latter which creates construct 
truncation and on which the current thesis will, therefore, focus. Construct truncation due to 
inadequate item sampling is particularly prevalent in two kinds of study.  The first is in 
studies concerned with constructs originating in psychopathological paradigms which have 
come to be studied in non-clinical populations. The second is when ‘normal’ measures are 
administered to extreme-scoring populations.   
A range of traits related to the psychopathological constructs of autism spectrum 
disorder, psychosis, depression, and personality disorders are now routinely measured in non-
clinical samples on the assumption that there is meaningful variation in these traits below 
their established clinical thresholds (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Wheelright, Skinner, Martin, & 
Clubley, 2001; Crawford & Henry, 2005; Jones & Paulhus, 2014; Verdoux & van Os, 2002). 
However, the scales measuring these constructs may not include items that can reliably 
capture this sub-clinical variation if they were developed and evaluated in the context of a 
psychopathological paradigm, and thus selected to show good discrimination near a clinical 
cut-off point and above (Reise & Waller, 2009). Items that showed good discrimination at 
moderate to low levels of that trait were, as a consequence, less likely to be selected.   It is 
also common for scales to fail to include items that reliably capture variation at the clinical 
levels of a trait (Facon, Magis, & Belmont, 2011). For example, the gold standard intellectual 
ability assessment used to diagnose intellectual disability in children (the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scales for children, Fourth Edition; WISC-IV; Wechsler, 2003) shows marked 
floor effects (Whitaker & Gordon, 2012). There is evidence that at least one subtest is 
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frequently omitted because the child is unable even to understand the test instructions 
(Murray, McKenzie, & Murray, 2015).  
Another area in which consideration of possible construct truncation is becoming 
increasingly pertinent is in the drive to produce briefer measures of constructs for contexts in 
which administration time is limited. For example, briefer versions of larger instruments are 
often of interest (e.g. Allison, Auyeung & Baron-Cohen, 2012; Donders, Elzinga, Kuipers, 
Helder & Crawford, 2013) for screening or reducing burden in clinical contexts. Similarly, 
brief measures of individual difference traits are appealing in large cohort or epidemiological 
studies (e.g. Rammstedt & John, 2007; see Weiss & Costa, 2014 for a criticism of this trend). 
However, abbreviating inventories will tend to entail a degree of construct truncation, 
especially if it further compounds selection on the basis of high item inter-correlations.  
Evidence for construct truncation due to item selection comes from studies using an 
item response theory approach to examine the range of trait values for which a scale provides 
a reliable measure (Embretson & Reise, 2000). Item and test information is estimated for a 
range of trait values and portions of the continuum in which it - and by extension- reliability 
is low can be identified. Evidence also comes from score distributions where a 
disproportionately high number of scores are found to be at one or other end of the scale. 
Possible examples of construct truncation due to item sampling are provided in Table 1.2.
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Table 1.2: Examples of construct truncation due to item selection 
Construct Nature of construct truncation Possible implications 
Personality Gomez, Cooper, and Gomez (2005) found precision of measurement for 
the Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral Activation Systsm 
(BIS/BAS) scales (Carver & White, 1994) to be good only for moderately 
low to moderately high trait levels. 
The scales cannot reliably capture high and 
low levels of the BIS/BAS traits. 
Intellectual 
ability 
Whitaker & Gordon (2012) demonstrated, using score distributions in low 
functioning individuals, that the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children 
Fourth Edition (WISC-IV) had marked floor effects. 
Estimates of severity of intellectual impairment 
are poor for those with low IQ (also see 
Murray & McKenzie, 2014). 
Physical 
functioning  
Hays, Liu, Spritzer, & Cella (2007) showed that a physical functioning 
scale developed as part of a patient-reported outcome measurement and 
information system (PROMIS) project showed adequate reliability only at 
low levels of functioning. 
Ability to detect the effects of interventions to 
improve physical functioning may be 
diminished by ceiling effects. 
Memory  Uttl (2005) identified ceiling effects in a range of widely used memory 
tests when administered to normal healthy adults by examining test norms 
and in examining score distributions in a new sample. 
Uttl (2005) listed the main issues as non-
normal test scores, artificially lowered mean 
and attenuated standard deviations and 
validity. 
Religiosity Genia (2001) found evidence for ceiling effects in the Spiritual Well-
being Scale (SWBS; Paloutzian & Ellison, 1982), especially in Christian 
respondents.   
It is not possible to discriminate reliably 
between individuals scoring high on religious 




Osgood, McMorris, and Potenza (2001) used an IRT approach to evaluate 
a self-report scale of offending behaviour from the Monitoring the Future 
study. The trait was  measured reliably for moderate to serious offenders 
but not for the least delinquent third of the population  
The scale cannot differentiate among 





Van den Oord, Pickles, and Waldman (2003) used an IRT approach to 
show that a range of emotional and behaviour problem measures in the 
National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent were not measured well at the 
healthy end of the continuum  
While the underlying liability for a 
psychopathological trait may be normally 




There is relatively less evidence bearing on the commonality of construct truncation 
due to item sampling. One reason is that until recently, most scales were developed and 
evaluated within a classical test theory approach which lends itself less well to identifying 
construct truncation. Classical test theory approaches typically assume that the reliability of a 
test is constant across the continuum of the measured trait and is, therefore, not equipped to 
identify reduced reliability at the extremes. Modern test theory, in dispensing with this 
assumption from the beginning, provides a more natural framework for evaluating possible 
construct truncation. Techniques from modern test theory are showing increasing uptake; 
therefore, more evidence on the matter is likely to emerge in the coming years. However, in 
tests developed using classical test theory it is still possible to apply IRT to the resulting item 
set and to examine score distributions for evidence of floor and ceiling effects. 
 What are the consequences of construct truncation for research? 
The consequences of construct truncation can be considered in terms of how the 
sample distribution of a variable becomes distorted, relative to the corresponding population 
distribution.  To illustrate, consider the distribution in Figure 1.1. On the left hand side is the 
population distribution for some phenotype (mean=0, SD=1). On the right hand side is the 
corresponding distribution in a sample in which truncation has occurred, specifically, trait 
levels below -1SD are not sampled.   
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Figure 1.1: Population and truncated sample distributions for a phenotype 
 
Samples in which construct truncation has occurred will tend to mis-represent the 
mean of the target population. For example, in the phenotype represented in Figure 1.1, the 
mean in the truncated sample is not 0 but 0.29.  Given that estimating the mean of a construct 
is rarely an interesting research goal in its own right, a more pressing problem is the mis-
representation of mean differences between two groups when one group is subject to a greater 
degree of construct truncation than the other. Hunt and Madhyastha (2008) argued that many 
observed sex differences in intellectual ability were biased in this way. They noted that 
women are more likely than men to take the United States-based Scholastic Assessment Test 
for university admission. Given that taking the SAT is correlated with intellectual ability, 
they reasoned that the intellectual ability threshold for taking the SAT may tend to be lower 
for women. This would result in a higher proportion of less intelligent females taking the test, 
with the result that spurious group differences between males and females are introduced into 
many samples. Subsequent intellectual ability-related studies have noted how differential 
attrition across two groups being compared in longitudinal studies can also result in biasing 
of group comparisons (Dykiert, Gale, & Deary, 2009; Madhyastha, Hunt, Deary, Gale, & 
Dykiert, 2009).  
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Other examples come from possible diagnostic biases in psychiatry and clinical 
psychology whereby one group with a disorder is less likely to receive an appropriate 
diagnosis than another given the same level of impairment. When - as frequently occurs - a 
clinical diagnosis is in the inclusion criteria for an empirical study and those groups are then 
compared, this diagnostic bias can translate into inaccurate inferences with inappropriate 
theoretical implications (Krieser & White, 2014). For example, it has been argued that 
because of the preponderance of males with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and the general 
perception that it is a ‘male disorder’, females must show more severe autistic symptoms or 
additional behavioural or psychological anomalies than males with equal levels of 
impairment to receive a clinical diagnosis (Murray et al., submitted). As a result, it is not 
clear whether the apparently greater severity of ASD symptoms in females compared with 
males with clinical diagnosis (Dworzynski, Ronald, Bolton, & Happé, 2012; Carter et al., 
2007; Hartley & Sikora, 2009) is genuine or an artefact of a higher selection threshold - and 
greater construct truncation - at the point of diagnosis 
This is just one specific example of the more general difficulty of testing the ‘gender 
paradox’ theory in clinical samples. The theory holds that whenever there are sex differences 
in symptom prevalence, the less-often affected sex will be the more severely affected sex. 
However, if the more-often affected sex is more likely to be selected into clinical samples 
given the same level of severity because of identification, referral and diagnosis biases, these 
samples will provide biased estimates of sex differences in symptomology (e.g. Biederman et 
al., 2014). 
A related issue is ‘Berkson’s bias’: the idea that estimates of psychiatric co-morbidity 
are inflated within clinical samples because different disorders may independently influence 
treatment-seeking (e.g. Maric, Myin-Germeys, Delespual, de Graaf, Vollenbergh & Van Os, 
2004). Berkson’s bias confounds attempts to estimate psychiatric co-morbidity from clinical 
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samples because those with the highest levels of general psychopathology (often meaning 
multi-morbidity) are over-represented.  
Construct truncation also results in a reduction in the variance of the sample 
distribution of a construct relative to the corresponding population distribution, an effect 
often referred to as ‘range restriction’ (e.g. Alexander, Carson, Alliger, & Barret, 1984). For 
example, where the population variance for the phenotype shown in Figure 1.1 is 1 (left 
panel), the variance in the truncated sample is .63. The importance of this is less in the 
variance reduction per se than the knock-on effect it has on the covariances and correlations 
of that construct with others, both of which will be attenuated (Sackett & Yang, 2000; 
Ghiselli et al., 1981).   
To illustrate, assume that the phenotype in Figure 1.1 is correlated with a second 
variable at r=.70 and that there is no additional truncation on this second phenotype. The 
scatterplot for these variables in the population is shown in the left panel of Figure 1.2 and in 
the truncated sample in the right panel of Figure 1.2. The correlation is attenuated in the 
truncated sample to r=.53 Examples of correlations possibly affected by range restriction 
abound in the psychological literature. Some of the best-studied examples are from 
organisational psychology in which selection tests are validated against job performance in 
successful applicants (e.g. Yang, Sackett & Nho, 2004). The correlations between selection 
test scores and job performance are attenuated in these samples because they exclude the 
individuals with lower scores. Furthermore, because variances, covariances and correlations 
represent the basic building blocks for more complex statistical tests, construct truncation 
biases these in much the same way.  For example, in behaviour genetic models, range 
restriction may contribute to overestimation of heritability because MZ correlations will tend 
to be attenuated to a lesser degree than DZ correlations due to selective non-participation 
(Taylor, 2004); in factor analysis, it will tend to reduce factor loadings and inter-correlations 
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(Muthen, 1990); and in moderated multiple regression it will decrease the power to detect 
interactions (Aguinis, 1995). 
Figure 1.2: Scatterplot for variables in population and truncated sample 
 
 
More comprehensive discussions of the impact of range restriction on various 
statistics are available from several sources, including discussions of reliability (Fife, 
Mendoza, & Terry, 2012; Sackett et al., 2002), effect size measures (Bobko et al., 2001), 
regression (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aitken, 2013), moderated multiple regression (Aguinis, 
1995; Aguinis & Stone-Romero, 1997) factor models (Muthén, 1989, 1990), behaviour 
genetic models (Martin & Wilson, 1982; Neale, Eaves, Kendler, & Hewitt, 1989; Taylor, 
2004; Dominicus, Palmgren, & Pedersen, 2006), and meta-analysis (Hunter et al., 2006).  
 Finally, construct truncation can result in sample distributional shapes that depart 
from that of the underlying population distribution. Constructs that are normally distributed 
12 
 
in the population will often be skewed in a sample subject to construct truncation. Although 
change in shape can result in a slight bias in the correlation between that construct and others 
(e.g. Bishara & Hittner, 2012), the bigger problem is that it can lead to masked or spurious 
interactions when the construct is used as an outcome in, for example, moderated multiple 
regression models,  gene-environment interaction models,  or factorial ANOVA or other 
models employed to test higher-order effects (Embretson, 1996; Kang & Waller, 2005; 
Molenaar & Dolan, 2014; Schwabe & van den Berg, 2014; Stone & Holllenbeck, 1989).  For 
example, Wang Zhange, McArdle, & Salthouse, (2008) illustrated that when a test exhibits 
ceiling effects but groups differ in proportions of participants scoring at ceiling, spurious 
group by time interactions can be observed.  They compared memory test scores from older 
and younger adults measured repeatedly over time. As the latter had more participants 
scoring at ceiling at baseline, they exhibited the smallest change; however, because their 
initial were scores likely under-estimated due to ceiling effects,  the interaction between age 
and time was likely to be at least partly spurious. 
 However, the fact that a construct is truncated does not, by definition, mean that there 
is serious bias in statistical analyses involving it. As discussed in later chapters, the degree 
and manner to which this occurs depend on the statistical test of interest, the population to 
which one wishes to generalise and, of course, the extent of construct truncation.   
 What can we do about construct truncation? 
 Given the bias in statistical results that can arise due to construct truncation, it is 
important to consider what can be done to identify, characterise and mitigate such bias. 
Identifying problematic construct truncation requires some knowledge of the population 
distribution of the construct. Occasionally this is possible because a measure has been 
normed using population data.  However, as Marcus & Schütz (2005) caution, even norming 
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data can be subject to degrees of truncation, especially when it relies on volunteer samples. 
Other times, a reasonable assumption can be made about the population distribution. In the 
cases where the population distribution is known, or can be assumed, it may be possible to 
diagnose and even correct for bias due to construct truncation.  For example, information and 
assumptions about the population distribution of a trait or its relation to selection into or out 
of the sample can be used to create selection models, derive sampling weights, apply range 
restriction formulae, or employ models such as tobit regression models to attempt to correct 
for the construct truncation. These corrections are, however, fallible, require strong 
assumptions, difficult to apply retrospectively to already-published results and become 
impractical for more complex selection scenarios and statistical models. 
 For example, a variety of different range restriction corrections tailored to different 
scenarios are available to estimate the correlation between variables in the population given 
its value in a selected sample (see Hunter et al., 2006; Sackett & Yang, 2000; Schmidt, Oh & 
Le, 2006) . Reversing the corrections also allows an estimate of the opposite, which may be 
useful, for example, in studying the effects of range restriction in methodological studies. To 
obtain accurate results using a range restriction correction is, however, very difficult. It is, 
first of all necessary to have knowledge of the kind of selection that has occurred. A 
distinction can be made, for example, between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ selection, with the 
former referring to selection based on the observed scores of one of the variables to be 
analysed and the latter referring to selection on some third variable that is correlated with 
these scores.  Applying a direct range restriction correction to indirectly selected variables 
will generally lead to under-correction (Alexander et al., 1984; Linn, 1983). The selection 
mechanism underpinning a given case of range restriction is not something that can be 
inferred from the sample data alone (e.g. see Hanges, Rentsch, Yusko & Alexander, 1991) 
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and in the absence of information about the true selection mechanism, there has been a 
tendency in empirical studies to assume simple direct selection (Sackett et al., 2007).  
 Second, it is often difficult to obtain good estimates of the values required to apply 
range restriction corrections. For example, the correction formula for the simple case of direct 















where 𝑟𝑋𝑌 is an estimate of the population correlation, 𝑟
′
𝑋𝑌 the correlation in the selected 







2 are standard deviation and variance ratios respectively for 
X in the population to sample and thus requires estimates of the population variance of the 
variable to be known. As noted above, however, the population variance of many variables is 
unknown and even when normative data is available this may itself have been subject to a 
degree of selection and, therefore, not provide an accurate estimate of population variance 
(Marcus & Schuz, 2005). 
 Finally, this and other range restriction correction formulae assume that the 
regression of Y on X (or of each variable on all others in multivariate extensions) is linear 
and homoscedastic across its entire range. This assumption is not testable for the parts of the 
distribution that are unmeasured. In fact, given the frequency with which hypotheses 
regarding non-linear effects of the kinds of individual difference traits that tend to influence 
selection into research studies are advanced, it is likely that at least mild violations of this 
assumption occur from time to time. Miller (1994), for example, noted that treatment effects 
in high risk studies in behavioural medicine (which are subject to range restriction on the 
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outcome of interest) are likely to be non-linear because treatment will be most effective for 
the most severely affected.  
 Therefore, there remains an important role for simulation studies modelling the 
mechanisms and consequences of construct truncation to characterise its effects and develop 
and test new ways to counteract it. Finally, outside of a few specific research areas 
(particularly personnel selection), construct truncation has received little attention and it 
seems that there is a general lack of awareness of its effects. Therefore, it is important to 
continually assess, both conceptually and statistically, whether, and in what way, the 
empirical evidence in a given research domain is affected by construct truncation. It is based 
on these observations that the aims of the current thesis were developed: to contribute to the 
characterisation and mitigation of the adverse effects of construct truncation on psychological 
research.  
I begin in Chapter 2 with a focus on construct truncation due to person selection. I 
outline the potential issues of relying on clinically ascertained samples when conducting 
research on psychopathological phenotypes. I use a specific example from an empirical 
research domain concerned with understanding the etiology of autism spectrum disorders 
(ASD). I use this example to address how relying on clinical samples for empirical research 
into particular disorders may provide distorted pictures of the inter-relations of the symptoms 
of those disorders, as well as their relations with putative causes and consequences. I argue 
that when a clinical trait is merely the extreme end of a continuum, clinical samples can be 
subject to strong and distorting selection. I argue that the low inter-correlations among the 
symptoms of ASD cited as evidence that they have distinct etiologies may be under-stated 
because this evidence has been based on clinical samples which are by definition selected on 
these symptoms. I support these arguments with evidence from a statistical simulation and a 
real data example.  
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In Chapter 3 I argue that construct truncation due to person selection can work in 
subtle, hard-to-detect ways, drawing on an example from individual differences research.  I 
discuss the ‘intelligence compensation hypothesis’. This is the idea that conscientiousness 
levels become calibrated to intellectual ability levels because less intelligent individuals need 
to work harder to achieve in life, while more intelligent people can rely on their superior 
abilities. I argue that much of the evidence for the ‘intelligence compensation hypothesis’ 
could reflect artifacts of using samples selected with respect to achievement. Specifically, I 
argue that many of the negative associations between conscientiousness and cognitive ability 
that have been observed in these samples have likely been spurious because of the actions of 
a ‘composite selection’ mechanism. Composite selection in this context refers to self-
selection of participants higher in achievement into the populations subsequently used as 
samples in research studies. Here, a ‘composite’ of conscientiousness and cognitive ability 
determines achievement (which influences later selection into a research study). Because 
selection occurs on a composite of conscientiousness or cognitive ability rather than either 
alone, high levels of cognitive ability can compensate for low levels of conscientiousness, 
and vice versa with regards to entry to the research sample. Samples of individuals selected 
on achievement can, thus, show a negative correlation between these two variables, even if 
the two constructs are completely independent at the population level. I evaluate this 
hypothesis using a real data example. In the example, I artificially introduce selection on 
achievement in the sample to investigate how this affects the apparent association between 
conscientiousness and ability. Results suggest that the true association between cognitive 
ability and conscientiousness may be zero or positive in reality but that construct truncation 
on achievement can give the appearance of a negative association.  
In Chapter 4, I focus on construct truncation due to item selection. I discuss an 
important consequence of selecting items that fail to measure the full range of a construct 
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reliably: that of potentially distorted estimates of GxE interaction in behaviour genetic 
models. I outline the implications of using the raw scores from scales which have poor 
discrimination at one end of their continua. I discuss two potential solutions: a non-linear 
transformation of raw scores and an item response theory score from an appropriate 
measurement model. I then use statistical simulation and examples in real data to explore the 
extent to which these proposed solutions mitigate the adverse effects of using a scale with 
poor discrimination in one part of the latent continuum. Results suggest that transformed raw 
scores and IRT scores perform reasonably well in reducing the bias that would otherwise be 
introduced into tests of GxE when using scales that fail to measure one end of a trait 
distribution reliably; however, neither method eliminated bias. Of the two methods, I 
recommend using IRT scores because they showed slightly less bias and type 1 and type 2 
error rates were slightly better than those using a non-linear transformation. I also discuss 
other advantages of using IRT scores over transformed raw scores. 
Finally, in the Chapter 5, the Discussion, I show how the issues raised in the 3 
previous chapters are all aspects of the broader issue of construct truncation. I discuss the 
collective implications of the thesis studies for the mechanisms of, consequences of, and 
possible solutions to construct truncation. Specifically, I argue that the results of the studies 
in the preceding chapters suggest that distortions in commonly used analyses due to construct 
truncation in varying forms and degrees of severity are likely to occur in a broad range of 
empirical research studies. I discuss the circumstances under which it tends to occur and the 
kinds of misleading substantive conclusions that can result. I argue that it is important to 
consider the possibility that data are affected in this way and to take steps to characterise and 
mitigate the consequences. I also highlight the limitations of the research contained within the 
current thesis and offer some suggestions for future research. I end by summarising the most 
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promising solutions suggested by the research contained within the thesis but also highlight 
the challenges of implementing them in practice. 
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Chapter 2: Construct truncation due to the use of clinically ascertained samples in 
autism spectrum disorder research 
 In research into clinical phenotypes, it is common to recruit samples comprised solely 
of individuals who have received a formal diagnosis of that disorder. It is similarly common 
to analyse clinically diagnosed and control cases separately. However, the assumption that 
clinical phenotypes are on continua that span clinical and ‘normal’ levels is gaining 
increasing acceptance (e.g. Caspi et al., 2014). In this view, individuals who receive a clinical 
diagnosis do not differ qualitatively from those without; they merely represent an extreme on 
the same continuum. This implies that to obtain unbiased estimates of population parameters 
concerning that phenotype, clinical cases and controls should be analysed together, 
irrespective of diagnostic status.  Reliance on clinically-diagnosed samples would restrict the 
phenotypic ranges studied and, in turn, attenuating correlations involving these phenotypes. 
In this chapter, I discuss how this kind of range restriction may have affected our 
understanding of the inter-relatedness of the classical triad of autism spectrum disorders 
(ASD).  
 The use of clinical and control samples in autism spectrum disorders 
 There is increasing consideration and acceptance of the hypothesis that ASD traits 
exist on continua that span clinical and non-clinical levels (e.g. Frazier et al., 2010; 
Lundström et al., 2012; Murray, Booth, McKenzie, Kuenssberg, & O’Donnell, 2014). In this 
view, individuals who receive a clinical diagnosis of ASD are simply the extreme end of this 
continuum, rather than manifesting some qualitatively distinct condition (Austin, 2005). This 
being true, any correlation-based analysis that focuses exclusively on either clinically 
diagnosed or control individuals is liable to yield phenotypic associations that are attenuated 
due to range restriction. However, to analyse clinically diagnosed and control individuals as a 
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single sample is rare. Most studies focus on one group, or - where both are recruited - 
conduct separate analyses by group (e.g. Baron-Cohen & Wheelright, 2004; Wheelright et al., 
2006; Stewart, Allison, Baron-Cohen, & Watson, 2015). In the section that follows, I discuss 
possible implications that this has had for the hypothesis that ASD is a ‘fractionable 
disorder’.  
The fractionable triad hypothesis 
 There is considerable interest in establishing how strongly related different areas of 
deficits in ASD are. The question has formed the basis of numerous empirical and review 
studies, including a recent special issue of the journal Autism (2014, vol 18, issue 1). While it 
has long been acknowledged that ASD is an extremely heterogeneous disorder (Rutter, 2014), 
over time these observations have evolved into the hypothesis that ASD is fractionable 
disorder; that is, it comprises multiple, somewhat independent, symptom domains (see Happé 
& Ronald, 2008 for a review).  
When expressed in terms of the classical triad of ASD the hypothesis is referred to as 
the ‘fractionable triad’ hypothesis. The hypothesis holds that the three classical symptoms of 
ASD: deficits in reciprocal social interaction, communication, and restrictive and repetitive 
stereotyped behaviour, are not all manifestations of the same underlying disorder; rather they 
represent separate domains of impairment whose confluence is ASD. From this basic idea, 
discussions have expanded to consider the fractionation of ASD symptomology more 
broadly; in terms of the two diagnostic domains of the DSM 5 (Mandy et al., 2014); cognitive 
symptoms (Brunsdon & Happé 2014); and genetic and environmental etiology (Dworzynski 
et al., 2009; Mazefsky et al., 2008; Robinson et al., 2012). 
 The fractionation hypothesis has received so much attention because it is viewed as 
having important theoretical and practical implications.  First, it underscores the importance 
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of using assessments that capture all symptom domains because if these domains are 
relatively independent, global assessments may omit key features of an individual’s symptom 
profile (Happé & Ronald, 2008). Second, it implies no requirement for ASD symptoms to be 
specific to ASD because, under the fractionation hypothesis, ASD is the co-occurrence and 
not the root cause of specific ASD symptoms. Third, distinct etiologies of ASD symptoms 
suggest that searches for specific causes should focus efforts on specific symptoms. A fourth 
possibility is that treatments will have symptom-specific rather than global effects and, by the 
same token, should be targeted at specific symptoms to maximise chances of alleviation.  
Historically, key pieces of evidence contributing to development of the fractionation 
hypothesis and now cited in its support are correlations between different symptom domains 
in individuals with a clinical diagnosis of ASD that are only low to moderate (Brunsdon & 
Happé, 2014; Dworzynski et al., 2009; Happé & Ronald, 2008 ; Kolevzon et al., 2004; 
Mandy et al., 2014). However, symptom correlations in clinically diagnosed individuals may 
represent significant underestimates of the corresponding population values because of range-
restricting selection arising from the diagnostic process. In the section that follows, I use what 
is known about the diagnostic process and subsequent use of clinically diagnosed samples in 
research to build a statistical model of range restriction in fractionation hypothesis research. I 
use this model to gauge the impact of this practice, and provide a range of estimates for the 
‘true’ associations between symptoms.  
 Individuals who meet the diagnostic criteria for ASD are a select group comprising 
approximately only 1% of the population (Baird et al., 2006; Baron-Cohen et al., 2009). They 
are not a random sample, but a select sub-section of the population representing the extremes 
of ASD traits. It has long been known that when samples are selected with respect to some 
trait, the variance of that trait is attenuated (e.g. Pearson, 1903). This is range restriction, and 
it tends to reduce correlation with other variables as well. The simplest form of range 
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restriction is ‘explicit’ or ‘direct’ selection on some variable X, when the correlation between 
X and some other variable Y is of interest. That is, the variable X on which the sample is 
selected is identical with the variable X which is utilised in analyses in the selected sample, 
and there is a strictly observed cut-off score for inclusion. This situation most commonly 
arises when X is some aptitude test used to select candidates for a job and Y is an index of 
job performance in the successful candidates in order to validate the aptitude test X (e.g. 
Berry et al., 2011). The extent to which the variance of X and its correlation with Y is 




= 𝑢𝑋, where 𝑆𝐷′ is the standard deviation of X in the selected sample and 𝑆𝐷 is the standard 
deviation of X in the population. Lower values of 𝑢𝑋 represent stronger selection on the 
variable X. Given 𝑢𝑋,  the Pearson correlation between X and Y in the selected group will be: 
𝑟′𝑋𝑌 =  
𝑢𝑋𝑟𝑋𝑌
√𝑢𝑋2𝑟2𝑋𝑌+1−𝑟2𝑋𝑌
   ,              
(2.1) 
 
where 𝑟𝑋𝑌 is the correlation between X and Y in the unrestricted population. From Eq. 2.1, it 
can be seen that whenever 𝑢𝑋   is less than 1, the Pearson correlation between X and Y will be 
downwardly biased in the selected sample.  
Diagnosing ASD is also a selection process that reduces variance in the traits of 
interest and, in turn, is likely to attenuate symptoms correlations relative to the population. 
The selection process is more complex than the job selection example and cannot be 
represented using the simple model in Eq. 2.1.  First, ASD diagnosis does not involve direct 
selection on measured scores on the X variable(s). That is, a clinician cannot simply ‘read 
off’ an individual’s levels of, say, social, communication and restrictive, repetitive 
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impairments or behaviours and assign those with a score above certain cut-off points a 
diagnosis of ASD. Instead, the process involves a combination of formal assessment and 
clinical judgement (Allison et al., 2012). As a consequence, scores on measures of ASD 
symptoms obtained in subsequent research will not be identical to the criteria by which a 
clinician has assigned a diagnosis. The process of diagnosing ASD and then selecting 
participants for a research study, therefore, represents an example of ‘indirect selection’, 
defined as occurring when the selection variables are not identical with the variables that 
form the basis of subsequent empirical analyses (Hunter et al., 2006). In the terminology of 
range restriction, therefore, the triad or other features of ASD of interest in an empirical study 
represent ‘incidental variables’ which are selected by virtue of being correlated with the 
unmeasured variables on which selection (diagnosis) takes place (i.e. the selection variables).  
Another way in which the case of ASD diagnosis is more complicated than the simple 
job selection example is that ASD diagnosis requires the presence of symptoms in multiple 
domains to be present. This makes ASD diagnosis a case of simultaneous multivariate – 
rather than univariate - selection (Sackett & Yang, 2000). DSM IV diagnosis required deficits 
in three of the areas of the classical triad and was, therefore, a case of trivariate selection. The 
new DSM 5 criteria requires deficits in social communication – which combines the social 
and communication dimensions of the classical triad - coupled with the presence of restricted, 
repetitive behaviours, entailing a shift to bivariate selection. A multivariate selection formula 
was developed by Aitken (1934) and subsequently extended by Lawley (1944) to deal with 
situations such as this in which samples are selected on multiple variables. The formula 
provides a correction to estimate population associations in range-restricted samples. Based 
on the formula, an estimate of the population variance-covariance matrix V of the selection 



























where 𝑽𝒑,𝒑 is the variance-covariance matrix of the p selection variables in the population, 
𝑽′𝒑,𝒑 is the variance-covariance matrix of the p selection variables in the selected sample, 
𝑽′𝒏−𝒑,𝒑 and 𝑽′𝒑,𝒏−𝒑 are the covariance matrices for the p selection variables and n-p 
incidental variables in the selected sample and 𝑽′𝒏−𝒑,𝒏−𝒑 is the covariance matrix of the n-p 
incidental variables in the selected sample. However, it is apparent from Eq.  2.2 that in order 
to apply this correction, it is necessary to have information on the selection variables. This is 
simply not available in the case of ASD diagnosis because, as mentioned above, the selection 
variables are a composite of formal assessment and clinical judgement and the latter is not 
directly quantifiable. In fact, this information is rarely available for any multivariate selection 
problem (Hunter et al., 2006). This creates a challenge with respect to estimating the degree 
to which symptoms of ASD cluster together because any sample restricted to individuals with 
ASD will be liable to under-estimate their association, but owing to a lack of information on 
the selection variables, it will be difficult to assess the extent of the bias.  
While the possibility that range restriction may undermine the validity of results from 
clinical ASD samples has been noted (Happé & Ronald, 2008), there has not as yet been any 
systematic study or attempt to quantify the consequences of this kind of selection. ASD is 
fundamentally a clinical disorder and inferences regarding ASD should, therefore, come at 
least in part from samples of individuals who are actually diagnosed with the disorder: it 
would be undesirable to disregard all studies restricted to individuals with diagnosed ASD 
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from consideration because they are affected by range restriction. It was, therefore, the aim of 
the present study to attempt to characterise and quantify the effects of simultaneous selection 
within research studies focussed on individuals with a clinical diagnosis of ASD. I first 
present the results of a brief simulation exploring the potential effect of simultaneous 
selection on estimates of the inter-correlation among symptoms of ASD. I then provide a real 
data example comparing the correlation among ASD symptoms in individuals with diagnoses 
of ASD to a combined sample which includes both individuals with and without diagnoses of 
ASD.  
Method 
Simulation study  
 To receive a diagnosis of ASD, an individual has traditionally had to show deficits in 
all three domains of the classical triad, which I will here abbreviate to ‘Soc’, ‘Comm’ and 
‘RSB’; therefore, the majority of samples of individuals with clinical diagnoses of ASD are 
selected on these three traits. This makes it reasonable to hypothesise that it is this selection 
that produces that relatively low correlations among them that has inspired the ‘fractionable 
triad’ hypothesis. I, therefore, explored the effects of simultaneous selection using a range of 
possible population correlation magnitudes among simulated Soc, Comm and RSB variables.  
All analyses were conducted in R statistical software (R Core Team, 2013).  
Population model 
I began with a model in which RSB, Comm and SS had a trivariate normal 
distribution with means of zero and variances of 1 in the population. This corresponds to the 
idea that the traits are normally distributed in the population, with ASD representing the 
extremes of these traits (e.g. Austin, 2005; Lundström et al., 2012).  I simulated 10,000,000 
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cases to represent this population. Across different simulation conditions I varied the 
population correlations between RSB, Comm and SS. The population correlations utilised are 
provided in Table 2.1. Reflecting the evidence that Comm and SS are more strongly inter-
related than either is with RSB, I simulated non-uniform population correlations among the 
triad (e.g. Dworzynski et al., 2009).  
Selection model 
I simulated simultaneous selection from the populations described above in a manner 
designed to mimic the diagnostic process. I did this by selecting cases from the uppermost 
part of the univariate distributions of the three variables. I did not select on RSB, Soc and, 
Comm scores directly but generated a ‘selection variable’ for each. These selection variables 
were correlated at r≈0.75 with the corresponding symptoms to represent indirect selection 
and an appropriate level of fallibility of the diagnostic process.  I then selected cases based on 
being above the 95th percentiles on these selection variables. The 95th percentile has been 
used to define abnormality in studies of ASD traits utilising general population participants 
(e.g. Robinson et al., 2012).  
Quantifying bias 
I evaluated the effect of simultaneous selection on the sample symptom inter-
correlations and quantified the degree to which these sample estimates under-estimate the 
corresponding population value using percentage bias, computed as:  
 (𝑟′ − 𝑟)/𝑟 × 100% 
where 𝑟 is the simulated population correlation and  𝑟′  is the correlation in the selected 
sample. Percentage bias is commonly used to evaluate the extent to which a parameter is 
estimated accurately in simulation studies, including those concerned with the effects of 
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range restriction (e.g. Le & Schmidt, 2006). I also provide the determinant of the covariance 
matrix for the three variables before and after simultaneous selection. This provides a 
measure of generalised variance. The percentage bias in this statistic is computed in an 
analogous way to the bias in the individual correlation coefficients.  
Real data example 
 To complement the simulation study, I provide a real data example in which I 
compared the correlations between ASD symptoms in clinically diagnosed individuals to the 
corresponding correlations in a combined sample of individuals with a diagnosis of ASD and 
controls. 
Measures 
 I used the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ: Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The AQ is a 
50-item questionnaire (50% reverse-keyed) assessing 5 domains: Social Skill, Attention 
Switching, Attention to Detail, Communication and Imagination. Item content is based on the 
classical triad of ASD as well as other cognitive traits associated with ASD. Items are scored 
on a dichotomous response scale resulting in a possible range of scores for each domain from 
1-10. 
Previous studies have suggested that the AQ has favourable psychometric properties 
including good test-retest reliability, acceptable internal consistency, higher scores in 
clinically diagnosed than control samples, normally distributed scores in the population and 
correlations with other features of ASD (e.g. Allison et al., 2012; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; 
Takagishi et al., 2010). The advantage of the AQ in the context of the current study is that is 
based on a dimensional approach to ASD which conceptualises ASD traits as continuous in 
the population and, therefore, measurable even in individuals who do not meet diagnostic 
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criteria for ASD. Moreover, it was specifically designed to measure ASD traits across a broad 
range from normal to clinical levels. Indeed, evidence suggests that the AQ successfully 
captures variation in ASD traits in both clinically diagnosed and non-ASD individuals 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Hoekstra et al., 2011; Wheelright et al., 2010).  
Participants 
 Controls 
 Control participants came from 2 sources.  Ninety eight participants (27 males, 70 
females and 1 ‘other’ gender) came from an ongoing study of emotion recognition and ASD 
traits which included the AQ as a measure. The 98 were selected from a broader pool of 
participants that also included individuals who self-reported a diagnosis of intellectual 
disability, ASD or another psychiatric disorder.  The mean age of this sub-sample was 31.0 
(SD = 12.5).  The majority reported their occupation as ‘student’.  An additional 132 
participants (27 males, 105 females) came from an ongoing study of sex differences in ASD 
traits. The mean age of this sub-sample was 27.7 (SD = 12.7). Sixty eight of these 
participants reported their occupation as ‘student’. Both of the studies above had received 
ethical approval from the relevant ethics body. Participants were in both cases recruited 
online and from the University community. Online recruitment was via social networking 
sites such as facebook and twitter as well as dedicated study participation sites.  
 Cases 
 Participants with ASD came from a previous study of the AQ in clinically diagnosed 
individuals. The sample has been utilised and described in previous publications (Booth et al., 
2013; Kuenssberg et al., 2014; Murray et al., 2014) and is described comprehensively in 
Kuenssberg et al. (2014). The full sample includes 148 participants (107 males and 41 
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females) with a diagnosis of Asperger Syndrome or high functioning autism. High 
functioning autism was defined as meeting the criteria for autism but having normal 
intellectual functioning. Asperger syndrome was defined as meeting the criteria for high 
functioning autism but with no history of language delay. The mean age of the sample was 
33.3 (SD = 10.7). In the current study, I used the subset of participants with complete data on 
the five domains measured by the AQ (N = 132-135).  As the data were fully anonymised 
prior to receipt it is not possible to identify the specific demographic composition of this sub-
sample.  
Statistical Procedure 
 I first computed Pearson correlations between the 5 AQ domain scores in the ASD 
group and in a sample that combined both the ASD and control participants. I quantified the 
difference in Pearson correlation between the whole sample and ASD sub-sample, in a 
similar way as in the simulation study by computing the percentage difference between whole 
and ASD sub-sample: 
(𝑟𝐴𝑆𝐷 − 𝑟)/𝑟 × 100%, 
where 𝑟𝐴𝑆𝐷 is the correlation in the ASD sub-sample and 𝑟 is the correlation in the whole 
sample. I also computed an estimate of internal consistency for each of the AQ domains in 
the whole sample and the case sub-sample using Cronbach’s alpha. 
 Finally, I applied the most commonly used method of range restriction correction to 
the correlations in the case sample: the Thorndike case II formula from Eq. 1.1. I used this to 
obtain r*, an estimate of the range restriction corrected correlations assuming that the 
combined sample was the population. Although this is technically not the correct formula 
because it is designed for a situation in which direct selection has taken place, in practice it is 
30 
 
often used because of insufficient information about the selection process to permit the 
application of Eq. 2.2. The difference between results obtained using Eq 1.1 and the empirical 
estimates of the correlations are evaluated using the percentage difference between the range-
restriction corrected correlation and the whole sample correlation. For SD’ I used the 
empirical estimate of SD in the case sample; for SD I used the empirical estimate of SD in the 
combined sample; and for r’ I used the empirical estimate of r in the case sample. The 
purpose of this analysis was to evaluate the extent to which the most commonly used method 
of range restriction correction would give similar results to using the relevant population to 
which the formula aims to correct to.  
Results 
Simulation study 
Results from simulating simultaneous selection on Soc, Comm and RSB are provided 
in Table 2.1. These show how a selection mechanism representing the ASD diagnosis can 
lead to substantial under-estimates of symptom inter-correlations in samples of clinically 
diagnosed individuals. For example, if the simulation selection mechanism proposed has 
successfully represented a situation close to reality, then an observed correlation between 
RSB and Soc of r = .26 could correspond to a population correlation of r = .60. Other 
possible magnitudes of population and corresponding sample correlations can also be read off 
from Table 2.1.  
The results also highlight how the biggest percentage under-estimates of the 
correlation among symptoms occur when the relevant population correlation is itself smaller. 
For example, the percentage bias for a population correlation of .95 was only -13% whereas 
the percentage bias for a population correlation of .40 was approximately -65%. Therefore, to 
the extent that simultaneous selection attenuates symptom inter-correlations in ASD samples, 
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it is likely to do so to a greater extent for those domains that have smaller population 
correlations.  
 To provide more in-depth example, Figure 2.1 shows the bivariate density of RSB 
and Soc in the condition from the first row of Table 2.1. The contour plot in the left panel 
shows the population distribution and the right panel shows the distribution after 
simultaneous selection. It can be seen that the location of the distribution shifts towards the 
clinical end, the variance is reduced and the elliptical shape of the population distribution is 
lost in line with the decreasing correlation between the variables.  





Figure 2.2: Marginal distributions of RSB and Soc before and after selection 
 
The marginal distributions of the same two variables are shown in Figure 2.2. These, 
in addition to showing the shift in location and reduction in variance, highlight the positive 
skewness introduced by simultaneous selection. The top row shows the distributions in the 
population and the bottom row shows the distributions after simultaneous selection. The 
skews of RSB and Soc after selection are .35 and .41 respectively. 
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Table 2.1: Extents of attenuation of symptom inter-correlations and generalised 
variance under simultaneous selection 
RSB- Soc RSB -Comm  Comm-Soc Generalised variance Prevalence 
R r' % bias r r' 
 
% bias R  r’ % bias |∑| |∑|’ % bias  
.70 .34 -51 .70 .35 -50 .95 .83 -13 .049 .006 -87 .86% 
.60 .26 -57 .60 .26 -57 .95 .83 -13 .062 .007 -88 .69% 
.50 .19 -62 .50 .20 -60 .95 .83 -13 .073 .008 -89 .54% 
.40 .13 -68 .40 .14 -65 .95 .83 -13 .082 .008 -90 .42% 
.30 .10 -67 .30 .10 -67 .95 .83 -13 .089 .010 -91 .32% 
.60 .26 -57 .60 .25 -58 .90 .70 -22 .118 .013 -89 .65% 
.50 .19 -62 .50 .19 -62 .90 .70 -22 .140 .014 -90 .51% 
.40 .13 -68 .40 .13 -68 .90 .71 -21 .158 .014 -91 .40% 
.30 .09 -70 .30 .09 -70 .90 .71 -21 .172 .014 -92 .30% 
.70 .35 -50 .70 .34 -51 .80 .49 -39 .164 .019 -88 .73% 
.60 .25 -58 .60 .24 -60 .80 .50 -38 .216 .023 -90 .57% 
.50 .18 -64 .50 .18 -64 .80 .51 -36 .260 .024 -91 .45% 
.40 .14 -65 .40 .14 -65 .80 .52 -35 .296 .025 -92 .36% 
.30 .10 -67 .30 .11 -63 .80 .51 -36 .324 .025 -92 .26% 
.60 .26 -57 .60 .26 -57 .70 .37 -47 .294 .028 -91 .51% 
.50 .19 -62 .50 .18 -64 .70 .37 -47 .360 .031 -92 .40% 
.40 .14 -65 .40 .14 -65 .70 .39 -44 .414 .031 -93 .30% 
.30 .10 -67 .30 .10 -67 .70 .39 -44 .456 .031 -93 .22% 
.50 .19 -62 .50 .19 -62 .60 .29 -52 .440 .036 -92 .35% 
.40 .14 -65 .40 .14 -65 .60 .29 -52 .512 .037 -93 .26% 
.30 .09 -70 .30 .10 -67 .60 .21 -65 .568 .038 -93 .19% 
.40 .14 -65 .40 .14 -65 .50 .21 -58 .590 .040 -93 .23% 
.30 .08 -73 .30 .09 -70 .50 .20 -60 .660 .041 -94 .17% 




Real data example 
 Descriptive statistics for the cases, controls and combined sample are provided in 
Table 2.2. As expected, the mean scores for all 5 domains were higher in the cases than in the 
controls. The standard deviations did not differ markedly between the cases and control 
groups but, as expected, were larger in the combined sample than in either of the case or 
control sub-samples. The ratios of the SDs of the domain scores in the ASD sample to those 
in the combined sample are in the last column of Table 2.2. The largest SD difference was 
observed in Attention Switching domain (.52). The smallest difference was for the Attention 
to Detail domain (.97) and suggested only minimal range restriction.  
 Figure 2.3 shows the score distributions in the combined sample. There is not much 
evidence for bi-modality arising from clinical and control samples. Bi-modality would 
suggest possible range enhancement. However, the Social Skills, Communication and 
Imagination subscales showed some evidence of floor effects while the Attention Switching 
subscale showed some evidence of ceiling effects.  Figure 2.4 shows the scatterplot matrix of 
the AQ subscale scores in the combined sample. Loess lines are added to highlight any non-
linearity of the associations. Such non-linearity could indicate that the assumptions of range 
restriction corrections are violated. There was some evidence of non-linearity, particularly 
involving Attention Switching; however, for the most part a linear trend provided a 




Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for ASD, non-ASD and combined samples for the 5 AQ 
domains 












7.95 (2.14) 3.43 (2.93) 5.14 (3.45) .62 
Attention Switching 8.47 (1.52) 4.47 (2.43) 6.01 (2.88) .52 
Attention to Detail 6.36 (2.30) 5.06 (2.32) 5.58 (2.38) .97 
Communication 7.19 (2.19) 2.94 (2.42) 4.57 (3.10) .71 
Imagination 6.16 (2.51) 2.44 (1.93) 3.82 (2.80) .90 
 
Figure 2.3: Histograms of AQ subscale scores in combined sample 
 
Cronbach’s alpha values for the five domains were: Social Skills = .88, Attention 
Switching = .81, Attention to Detail = .66, Communication = .83 and Imagination = .78 
estimated in the whole sample. Based on the ASD sample alone Cronbach’s alpha levels 
were, as expected, generally lower: Social Skills = .75, Attention Switching = .50, Attention 





Figure 2.4: Scatterplot matrix of AQ subscale scores in combined sample 




The correlations among symptom domains measured by the AQ in both the combined 
case and control sample and the case sub-sample are provided in Table 2.3. In the combined 
sample the correlations between symptom domains ranged from r = .33 to r = .80. With the 
exception of the Attention to Detail domain which did not correlate well with other 
symptoms, all of the symptom correlations were large >.65. In the case sub-sample, all of the 
symptom inter-correlations were substantially smaller than in the combined sample. In the 
case sub-sample, symptom inter-correlations ranged from r = .21 to .55. The percentage 
differences between the combined and case sub-sample ranged from -16 to -45%. Therefore, 
the real data analysis supported the hypothesis that samples restricted to clinically diagnosed 
individuals could substantially under-estimate symptom inter-correlations.   
Range restriction corrected correlations are also provided in Table 2.3. Compared 
with the uncorrected correlations, these were generally closer to those in the combined 
sample and were in some cases identical or near-identical to those in the combined sample. 
The largest percentage differences between the corrected and combined sample estimates 
involved correlations with the Attention to Detail domain (-33% with Imagination and +28%) 
with Attention Switching. 
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Table 2.3: Correlation matrix of the 5 AQ domains in ASD versus combined sample 
 SS AS AD Comm  Imag 
Combined 
SS -     
AS .75 -    
AD .34 .40 -   
Com .80 .75 .38 -  
Imag .68 .66 .33 .69 - 
Controls 
SS - -20 -35 -13 -29 
AS .60 - -23 -25 -35 
AD .22 .31 - -32 -36 
Com .70 .56 .26 - -35 
Imag .48 .43 .21 .45 - 
Cases 
SS - -45 -29 -31 -22 
AS .41 - -25 -32 -32 
AD .24 .30 - -16 -36 
Com .55 .51 .32 - -26 
Imag .53 .45 .21 .51 - 
Range restriction corrected 
 SS AS AD Comm  Imag 
SS - -24 +9 -9 +4 
AS .57 - +28 0 +5 
AD .37 .51 - -13 -33 
Com .73 .75 .33 - -7 
Imag .71 .69 .22 .64 - 
Note: Correlations below the diagonal, % difference relative to combined sample above the 
diagonal. SS=Social Skills, AS= Attention Switching, AD= Attention to Detail, Com= 
Communication, Imag=Imagination.  
Discussion 
 In this chapter, I demonstrated that the selection process entailed in diagnosing 
individuals with ASD may lead to substantial attenuations of symptom inter-correlations in 
clinically ascertained research samples. I presented evidence that, considering individuals 
with and without ASD together, the correlations among symptom domains can be quite large, 
even when only modest in individuals with a clinical diagnosis of ASD. This has implications 
for the hypothesis that ASD comprises relatively distinct symptoms because it suggests that 
previous studies utilising clinical samples could have under-estimated the extent to which 
ASD symptoms correlate with one another.  
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I used a brief simulation study to estimate the magnitudes of observed correlations 
between ASD symptoms that could be expected, given different levels of population inter-
correlations and a selection mechanism corresponding to ASD diagnosis. I included a range 
of plausible simulation conditions in terms of the population correlations between symptoms.  
Consistent with the claim that these represent realistic conditions, all produced ASD 
prevalence estimates in the range observed in empirical studies which vary by country and 
methodology but are generally in the range of around 0.2 to 1.6% (Fombonne, 2003; Zaroff 
& Uhm, 2012).  Results showed that symptom inter-correlations are potentially substantially 
reduced in samples restricted to individuals who meet diagnostic criteria for ASD. Further 
support for this was found in a real data example in which I compared inter-correlations in an 
ASD and a combined ASD and control sample. In every case the correlation in the combined 
sample was substantially larger than in the ASD sub-sample.  
The simulation study focussed on the classical triad of ASD because it is within this 
framework that a large amount of the work on assessing the degree of fractionation of ASD 
symptoms has been conducted. Similar considerations nonetheless apply to other frameworks 
or features of ASD such as ‘the dyad’ of ASD (i.e. the social communication and restricted 
repetitive activities criteria of DSM 5) or performance on theory of mind or executive 
function tasks. The extent to which the inter-correlations among these ASD features in 
clinically diagnosed samples are downwardly biased will depend on several factors. First, it 
will depend on the population correlation between the features of interest.  Under most 
realistic conditions, the larger the population correlation, the smaller the attenuation of their 
association in a selected sample (Taylor, 2004). This is because as the population correlation 
gets smaller, both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio forming the correlation 
coefficient decrease. However, the numerator (the covariance between the two variables) 
decreases slower than the denominator (the product of their standard deviations) with 
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decreasing population correlations. Thus, the percentage bias in small population correlation 
coefficients will be bigger than that for large population correlation coefficients for a given 
degree of range restriction.  
In the case of the classical triad, this could have accentuated the difference in 
empirical inter-correlations between the Soc and Comm domains on the one hand and the 
RSB domain on the other that led to the former two symptoms being combined into a single 
domain in DSM 5 criteria while the latter remains distinct (e.g. Frazier et al., 2012). 
 Second, it will depend on how closely the symptoms of interest correspond to the 
variables on which diagnosis has been made. In range restriction terminology, this is the 
degree of association between the selection variables and the incidental variables. Stronger 
associations will result in larger biases. For example, for individuals diagnosed on the basis 
of DSM-IV, the correlations among the triad should be most strongly affected, with other 
features of ASD less directly selected affected to a lesser extent. 
 Third, it will depend on how strong the selection is. While it is the goal of clinicians 
to diagnose all individuals who genuinely meet the criteria for ASD and none who do not, 
uncertainty surrounding diagnosis is inevitable. Misdiagnosis of individuals can potentially 
mitigate the effects of selection on symptom inter-correlations by weakening the strength of 
selection on ASD symptoms in a clinically diagnosed sample. This can be thought of in terms 
of the sensitivity and specificity of the instruments used to make a clinical diagnosis and the 
diagnostic process as a whole. All else being equal, diagnostic procedures with high 
specificity (usually associated with lower sensitivity) will be associated with stronger 
selection. Similarly, if diagnostic criteria loosen, resulting in more individuals receiving 
diagnosis of ASD and corresponding increases in prevalence, then the effect of diagnosis on 
symptom inter-correlations in such samples will be reduced. It is expected that the move from 
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DSM-IV to DSM 5 diagnostic criteria may result in a slight reduction in the prevalence of 
ASD (Maenner et al., 2014); therefore, the effect of diagnosis on symptom correlations may 
increase in the future as the stricter criteria are adopted. Strength of selection is also affected 
by the fact that a minority of individuals with a diagnosis of ASD receive that diagnosis in 
spite of not meeting all diagnostic criteria. To the extent that these individuals are included in 
empirical studies of clinical samples, this can also mitigate the effects of clinical diagnosis on 
symptom inter-correlations, by weakening the strength of selection on ASD symptoms. 
Finally, though I have framed my demonstration in terms of symptom inter-
correlations because they have acquired a level of theoretical importance in the literature, the 
consequences of selection on ASD traits are also not limited to this parameter. Other statistics 
that depend on the variance or inter-correlation of variables in the sample will also be 
affected. This includes, for example, the reliability of psychometric assessments (Fife et al., 
2012), genetic and environmental variances and correlations (Dominicus et al., 2006), and 
factor model parameters (Muthén, 1990). For example, the real data example illustrated the 
attenuation of Cronbach’s alpha in clinically diagnosed individuals relative to that of a 
combined sample of clinically diagnosed and control cases.  
Collectively, these considerations suggest that investigations of ASD symptom inter-
correlations and related statistics should recruit and jointly analyse data from participants 
both with and without ASD (e.g. Constantino et al., 2004). This approach is justified if it is 
assumed that clinical ASD is merely the extreme end of a single trait or confluence of traits 
that are continuously distributed in the population. That is, autistic traits must be considered 
meaningful in the general population and not qualitatively different from the traits expressed 
by individuals with clinical diagnosis of ASD. Such a viewpoint is becoming increasingly 
accepted.  However, this approach also requires resolution of the practical issue of reliably 
and equivalently measuring ASD traits across both clinically diagnosed and community 
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populations (Murray et al., 2014). As Happé & Ronald (2008) noted, measures of ASD have 
face validity in clinically diagnosed samples but when the same measures are administered to 
individuals without a clinical diagnosis of ASD, it is not clear how the resulting data relates 
to clinical ASD. Measures of the broader autism phenotype (BAP) or autistic-like traits 
(ALTs) that aim to capture sub-clinical variation in ASD traits may be advantageous in this 
regard because they explicitly aim to capture levels of ASD traits that span normality and 
clinical ranges of the traits (see Wheelright et al., 2010).  
Where restricted samples are used, it may be worthwhile estimating range restriction 
corrected associations. While it is unlikely that they will yield accurate estimates of the ‘true’ 
association because this would rely on possibly unrealistic assumptions and accurate 
estimates of population variances of the variables involved, they can at least provide a 
sensitivity analysis. In the current study the range restriction corrected estimates in the real 
data example were, though imperfect, closer to the empirical estimates in the combined 
sample than were the empirical estimates in the case sample.  
Finally, if – as the current results suggest – the estimates of the association between 
different symptom domains are under-estimated in clinical samples, this suggests that the 
evidence for a fractionation between ASD symptoms may not be as strong as previously 
thought. Although it is generally accepted that the social and communication symptoms of 
ASD have a strong tendency to co-occur (hence their lumping together in DSM 5); there 
remains much debate about the extent to which these reflect the same syndrome as the non-
social symptoms of ASD. Perceptions of the extents of correlation between symptom 
domains can have a strong influence on psychopathology taxonomies, therefore, it is 
important to ensure that estimates of these are accurate. However, it is equally important not 
to rely too heavily on symptom inter-correlations as a basis for nosology. Ultimately, whether 
conceptualising two symptoms as belonging to the same disorder or not should be based on 
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whether doing so leads to useful ways of identifying individuals who may have a shared 
etiology or who may benefit from similar kinds of treatments. Furthermore, it is important to 
bear in mind that high symptom correlations need not mean a single unitary underlying 
syndrome: it can also reflect sets of shared causes, local interactions between symptoms, or a 
set of common end points from a range of causal pathways (i.e. equifinality). Thus, although 
it is important to obtain accurate estimates of symptom inter-correlations for the purposes of 
guiding theory and nosology, these alone cannot be relied upon to understand the causal 
processes underlying their association.  
Limitations 
 The simulation study was designed to reflect the process of diagnosis of ASD; 
however, because this selection cannot be characterised exactly, the possibility remains that 
the simulated process did not accurately reflect selection processes in the real world in some 
way. Second, the study focussed exclusively on symptom inter-correlations which have 
historically been important in the development of the fractionable triad hypothesis; however, 
these should not form the sole basis of substantive theory. For example, the fractionable 
hypothesis has also been informed by conceptual analyses, genetic etiology and neural 
substrates of the cognitive features of ASD (e.g. Happé & Ronald, 2008). Finally, the real 
data example was based on a convenience sample which was, therefore, not population-
representative.  Although the population distribution of AQ scores is not known, it is likely 
that individuals with high scores were over-represented because of the large number of 
clinical cases included in the combined sample. The clinical sample may also have been 
subject to the kind of diagnostic biases discussed in the introduction such as sex differential 
selection and Berkson’s bias. In addition, it is likely that the control samples had been subject 
to self-selection biases. For example, individuals who perceive themselves to be high in ASD 
traits or who have relatives with ASD may have a particular interest in participating in an 
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ASD study.  One possibility is that the correlations in the combined sample over-estimated 
the population correlation due to range enhancement. Range enhancement occurs when 
scores in the middle of a distribution are under-represented, leading to an over-estimation of 
an association. Therefore, it is important to note that the point of the example was not to find 
the ‘true’ association between the AQ domains, but to demonstrate that the range of trait 
levels included can have important effects on statistical results.  
Conclusions 
Samples restricted to individuals who meet the diagnostic criteria for ASD are likely 
to produce substantial under-estimates of the associations among different symptoms of ASD 
as a result of range restriction. Given that substantive theories of ASD and the development 
of diagnostic and treatment processes may depend on the strengths of inter-correlation among 
features of ASD, it is important to take into account that observed associations in clinically 




Chapter 3: How construct truncation on achievement may have distorted our 
understanding of the relation between conscientiousness and ability 
 The use of clinically ascertained samples discussed in the previous chapter is a 
common and obvious example of how range restricting selection can distort theoretical 
conclusions. However, construct truncation can operate in far more subtle and hard-to-detect 
ways. In this chapter I discuss the possibility that construct truncation on achievement has led 
to spurious evidence for what I label as the intelligence compensation hypothesis (ICH).  
Intelligence Compensation Hypothesis 
 The relations and interactions between personality traits and intelligence have, 
historically, been of considerable interest in individual differences research (e.g. Ackerman & 
Heggested, 1997; Austin et al. 2000; Murray, Booth & Molenaar, 2015). A recently emerged 
hypothesis regarding personality-intelligence interplay is the ‘intelligence compensation 
hypothesis’ (ICH). The hypothesis holds that individuals of low cognitive ability become 
more conscientious in striving to keep their achievement levels on a par with those of their 
high cognitive ability peers. Individuals high in cognitive ability, on the other hand, can 
accomplish the same or more with less effort and so have no need to maintain particularly 
high conscientiousness. In fact, in being able to rely on their cognitive ability, some may 
allow their levels of conscientiousness to slide. Given the link between both cognitive ability 
and conscientiousness-related traits and health, academic and occupational outcomes (e.g. 
Murray & Booth, 2015; Poropat, 2009; Wrulich, Brunner, Stadler, Keller & Martin, 2014), 
the ICH could have important practical as well as theoretical implications. Confirming and 
characterising a possible antagonistic relationship between cognitive ability and 
conscientiousness could facilitate a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between risk 
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factors for maladaptive behaviours and associated implications for prevention and 
intervention.  
 The ICH grew out of the observation that, in many samples, negative associations 
between cognitive ability and conscientiousness-related personality traits have been observed 
(e.g. Furnham, Moutafi, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2005; Furnham et al., 2007; Moutafi et al., 
2003; Moutafi, Furnham, & Paltiel, 2004; Moutafi, Furnham, & Crump, 2006; Furnham & 
Moutafi, 2012; Soubelet & Salthouse, 2011; Wood & Englert, 2009).   
In spite of the intuitive appeal of the ICH, evidence for the hypothesis is mixed. 
Counter to the hypothesis, some positive associations between cognitive ability and 
conscientiousness have been observed (e.g. Baker & Bishel, 2006; Lounsbery et al., 2005; 
Luciano et al., 2006) and other studies have yielded associations that were close to zero or 
non-significant (e.g. Bartels et al., 2012; Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2005; Furnham et al., 
2005).  
The role of sample composition 
A feature which appears to distinguish studies supporting the ICH is sample 
composition. Specifically, the majority of these studies have been conducted in samples 
which appear to have been subject to selection with respect to occupational or academic 
achievement. The studies of Moutafi et al. (2004) and Furnham and Moutafi (2012) used 
samples of junior to middle managers attending staff development centres, whilst other 
studies have utilised samples of managerial grade job applicants attending assessment centres 
(Furnham et al., 2007; Wood & Englert, 2009). Development and assessment centres are 
costly (Eurich, Krause, Cigularow, & Thorton, 2000). This means that organisations tend to 
invite only a small percentage of the total applicant pool when the purpose of attendance is to 
provide information for making selection decisions, and in training contexts, it is usually 
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individuals from managerial and professional populations who attend (Meriac, Hoffman, 
Woehr, & Flisher, 2008; Pepermans, Vloeberghs, & Perkisas, 2003). Similarly, the study by 
Furnham et al. (2005) used a sample of undergraduate students and entry to university 
involves selection on prior academic achievement (e.g. Hägglund & Larsson, 2006).  The 
study by Soubelet & Salthouse (2011) used a sample recruited via newspaper adverts and 
referrals from other participants. Although the sample was not selected in such an obvious 
way as a professional or student sample might be, the recruitment process and exclusion 
criteria (participants with Mini-Mental State Examination scores that indicated potential 
cognitive impairment were not eligible to participate; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) 
resulted in a sample who had an average of almost 16 years of education and were 
approximately 2/3 to 1 standard deviation above the national norms on cognitive ability.  
Compensatory selection 
The selected compositions of these samples raises the possibility that the apparent 
negative associations between intelligence and conscientiousness-related traits were due not 
to individual calibration of conscientiousness levels to ability level as proposed by the ICH, 
but to compensatory selection into the populations from which the research samples 
investigating the question are taken (see Sackett, Lievens, Berry, & Landers, 2007). To enter 
the population of individuals employed in professional jobs or the population of individuals 
undertaking university level education, a certain level of achievement (educational or 
occupational) is necessary. Compensatory selection refers to a process whereby selection into 
these populations through meeting these achievement criteria can be done through 
combinations of ability and hard work (i.e. conscientiousness). An individual of low 
conscientiousness can still enter the population if they are of high ability and an individual of 
low ability can still enter the population if they are of high conscientiousness; however, 
individuals with a combination of low conscientiousness and low ability are excluded.   
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Operationalising this situation statistically, one could think of selection into the 
research sample being based on a composite of IQ and conscientiousness: 
𝐴𝑐ℎ = 𝑏1𝐼𝑄 + 𝑏2𝑐𝑜𝑛,  
(3.1) 
where 𝑏1 and 𝑏2 are weights determining the contributions of IQ and conscientiousness to 
achievement. From eq. 3.1 it is obvious that whenever IQ is relatively low, high composite 
values can still be observed so long as high conscientiousness compensates for it. Setting an 
appropriate ‘achievement threshold’, individuals with co-occurring low conscientiousness 
and IQ will certainly be excluded; however, those with low values on one trait but high on the 
other may exceed the threshold. A research sample based on a population selected in this way 
could yield a negative correlation between IQ and conscientiousness even if they are not 
correlated or even positively correlated in the population because it will tend to have a greater 
proportion of people with discrepant IQ-conscientiousness scores than the general population. 
 The conceptual description above can be considered in more formal terms. Sackett et 
al. (2007) outlined the situations under which truncation of a composite such as that in Eq. 
3.1 would lead to spurious negative associations between its constituents. They noted that the 
correlation between components of the composite is attenuated according to the following 
equation, in which, for this chapter, I have presented in terms of the variables ‘ach’, ‘IQ’ and 
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where 𝑟′𝐼𝑄,𝐶𝑜𝑛 is the correlation between IQ and conscientiousness in the sample truncated 
with respect to achievement, 𝑟𝐼𝑄,𝑐𝑜𝑛 is the population correlation between IQ and 
conscientiousness, 𝑟𝐼𝑄,𝐴𝑐ℎ is the population correlation between IQ and achievement, 𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛,𝐴𝑐ℎ 
is the population correlation between conscientiousness and achievement, 𝑉′𝐴𝑐ℎ is the 
variance of achievement in the truncated sample and 𝑉𝐴𝑐ℎ is its variance in the population. 
The correlations between IQ and conscientiousness depend on the regression weights in Eq. 
3.1.  Truncation on Achievement can produce a negative association between 
Conscientiousness and IQ in a sample even when they are positively correlated in the 
population if the product of the correlations of each with Achievement (the second term of 
the numerator) is greater than their inter-correlation (the first term of the numerator). In these 
situations, subtracting this second term from the first will result in a negative number. This 
negative number is then added to the third term which is the product of the correlations 
between conscientiousness and Achievement, IQ and Achievement and the selection ratio 
capturing the extent of range restriction on Achievement. If the selection is a very small 
number, reflecting strong selection, the third term of the numerator as a whole will be small 
and fail to offset the negative number yielded by subtracting the second from first term.  
Here, a negative correlation between conscientiousness and ability will arise in the sample. 
For this to happen, conscientiousness and IQ would need to be relatively strongly correlated 
with Achievement but relatively independent of one another because under these 
circumstances the value of second term of the numerator would exceed the value of the first 
term. From a theoretical perspective, this seems plausible, suggesting that the situation 
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identified by Sackett et al. (2007) could apply to the conscientiousness-IQ associations cited 
as evidence of ICH.  
ICH, compensatory selection and achievement-IQ interactions 
To summarise the distinction between ICH and compensatory selection, the processes 
implied by the ICH suggest that there is a causal impact of ability on conscientiousness: a 
calibration of conscientiousness levels to ability. Compensatory selection invokes no such 
causal effect - it merely applies to situations where reaching any threshold required for 
selection into a sample can be accomplished through many different combinations of 
conceptually different variables, even when the threshold is only indirectly stated or assessed. 
In the ICH a negative association between ability and IQ is predicted in the population. On 
the other hand, if compensatory selection is true, it is more likely to be zero or at most very 
weakly positive or negative.  
Chapter aims 
In this chapter, I tested the hypothesis that the negative IQ-conscientiousness 
association observed in many previous studies is an artefact of truncation on achievement.  
To do so I used a sample for which there was little evidence of selection on educational and 
occupational achievement and which could, therefore, be considered reasonably free of 
achievement truncation. I also assessed the extent to which a negative association between 
conscientiousness and IQ could be induced by artificially introducing truncation on 
educational or occupational achievement. The purpose of this was to simulate the processes 
that may have occurred during the selection of many of the samples used to evaluate the 
conscientiousness-IQ relation. I also tested this compensatory selection hypothesis against a 
moderated association hypothesis in order to assess whether any apparent effects of 
compensatory selection simply reflected moderation of the effect of IQ on conscientiousness 
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by achievement. I hypothesised that 1) I would not find significant negative associations 
between conscientiousness traits and IQ in the whole (untruncated) samples, 2) negative 
associations could be induced by selection on educational achievement (in an adolescent 
sample) and occupational achievement (in a parent sample). 
Method 
Participants 
I analysed data from the Minnesota Twin Family Study (MTFS) and Sibling 
Interaction and Behaviour Study (SIBS). MTFS is a community-based longitudinal study of 
same-sex twins and their parents. Participants were recruited using a population-based 
method (for a full description see Iacono, Carlson, Taylor, Elkins, & McGue, 1999). It 
consists of two cohorts, one recruited when the twins were aged 11 years, and the other when 
the twins were aged 17.  Both cohorts have been followed approximately every three years 
since this initial wave of data collection. Compared to the US Census data for Minnesota, the 
MTFS sample appears to be generally representative of families with children living at home 
(Holdcraft & Iacono, 2004). Approximately 20% of invited participants declined to 
participate; however, more than 80% of those who declined completed a brief mail or 
telephone survey. This allowed a partial comparison of individuals who agreed to participate 
with those who did not so that any important differences could be identified. Parents in 
participating families had on average an additional 0.3 years of education (for additional 
comparisons see Iacono et al, 1999), which was judged to be only a small difference unlikely 
to have any practical influence on the current study.  
 SIBS is a community-based sample of pairs of adoptive and biological siblings and 
their parents recruited through adoption agencies. The families comprising the adoptive 
sample were selected to include an adolescent between the ages of 10 and 21 who was 
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adopted before the age of 2 and a second adolescent who was not biologically related and was 
no more than five years older or younger. The parents in these families were broadly 
representative of those accepting infant placements, but compared with Minnesota parents in 
the general population they were of higher socioeconomic status. The families in the 
biological families were recruited using birth records from the same area as the adoptive 
families.  Fifty-seven percent of eligible biological families agreed to participate and 63% of 
eligible adoptive families agreed to participate; however, 90% of the mothers from the 
remaining families completed a brief telephone interview, again allowing comparison of 
those who agreed and declined to participate. These groups did not differ on either 
educational or occupational level among the adoptive families but mothers from the 
participating biological families were more likely to have a college degree than those from 
non-participating families (44% of the sample had a college degree compared with an 39% 
for the comparison population of mothers in the same geographical region).  
Overall, therefore, the combined sample was slightly selected on parental education 
and socio-economic status but otherwise generally representative of individuals in the 
geographic region from which they were sampled and of parents of adoptive children. 
Adolescent Sample. 
In the adolescent sample, I used data from the 11- and 17-year-old MTFS cohorts and 
SIBS. I combined the data from the second wave of follow up in the 11-year-old cohort 
(targeting them at age 17) with the intake data from the other cohorts. Dependent on the data 
available on particular measures, I used different subsets of the total sample. The composition 
of these samples varied slightly but as an approximate guide, with complete data on the IQ 
and both measures of conscientiousness, there were 2412 participants (1100 males) with a 
mean age of 17.7 (SD = 0.69) 
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Parent Sample.  
I combined the parent data from the MTFS and SIBS cohorts, utilising data 
contributed at intake. Again, the specific subset of data used from the sample as a whole was 
dependent on the availability of particular measures. As an approximate guide, with complete 
data on the IQ and both of the conscientiousness measures, there were 3276 participants 
(1522 males) with a mean age of 42.5 (SD = 5.5).  
Measures 
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ). 
 Conscientiousness facets were measured using a 198-item version of the 
multidimensional personality questionnaire (MPQ; Tellegen & Waller, 2008). The MPQ 
contains two conscientiousness-related traits: Control and Achievement. For this chapter, I 
re-label the Achievement scale ‘Achievement-striving’ to avoid confusion with the measures 
of occupational and educational achievement. High scorers on Control endorse being 
reflective; cautious, careful, plodding; rational, sensible, level-headed, liking to plan activities 
in detail. High scorers on Achievement-striving endorse being hard-working, driving 
themselves, welcoming difficult and demanding tasks; persisting when others give up;  
ambitious , putting work and accomplishments before many other things  setting high 
standards and being perfectionistic. Items were measured on a 4-point response scale from 
‘Definitely True’ to ‘Definitely False’ and each scale had 18 items. Here I utilised the 
summed scale scores for the two measures. I analysed the facets of Control and 
Achievement-striving separately because there is growing evidence that facets within the 
domain of Conscientiousness have differential criterion and outcome associations (e.g. Bogg 
& Roberts, 2013). Thus analysing associations at the level of the broader dimension of 
conscientiousness risks obscuring substantively important facet-level processes.  
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Discussing their relations to the five-factor model, Gaugham, Miller, Pryor, and 
Lynam (2009) reported the highest correlations of MPQ Control to be with the Order (r = 
.56) and Deliberation (r = .68) facets of Conscientiousness in the NEO-PI-R, whilst MPQ 
Achievement-striving correlated most highly with the Achievement Striving (r = .60) and 
Self-Discipline (r = .52) facets. 
IQ  
The IQ measure completed by participants was an abbreviated version of the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Revised (WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1974) and included the 
Vocabulary, Information, Block Design and Picture Arrangement subtests. These subtests 
were chosen based on their high correlation (r =.90) with full scale IQ derived from all the 
subtests.  
Educational and Occupational Achievement. 
 For the adolescent sample I used grade point average (GPA) as a measure of 
educational achievement. To avoid problems of comparing grades across different school 
districts with different testing formats, procedures and standards, GPA was not computed 
from actual grades. Instead twins and their parents were asked to report, on a 5-point scale 
from 0 = failed class to 4 = much better than average, the grades typically received in 
language arts, maths, social studies and science classes. Here, GPA was the average across 
these ratings. This measure was validated against the actual school grades of a sub-sample of 
67 randomly selected participants from the age-11 cohort and found to correlate with these at 
.89. 
 For the parent sample, I used occupational level according to the Hollingshead’s 
(1957) occupational scale as a measure of occupational achievement. This is an eight-point 
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scale ranging from ‘unskilled’ to ‘major professional’. Higher ratings on the scale reflect 
higher levels of occupational achievement.   
Statistical Procedure 
Compensatory Selection 
I chose methods of evaluating the correlation between IQ and our two measures of 
conscientiousness (Control and Achievement-striving) were designed to mimic as closely as 
possible the methods that have been employed in the majority of previous studies finding 
negative associations between IQ and conscientiousness (e.g. Moutafi et al., 2004). I, 
therefore, used Pearson’s correlations between the scale scores on the personality measures 
and IQ. I dealt with missing data using pairwise deletion.  
I introduced truncation on achievement by discarding all individuals who were below 
progressively stricter thresholds of educational or occupational achievement. This was 
designed to mimic processes of selection into populations (e.g. undergraduate students, or 
assessment centre participants) in a manner that was dependent on educational or 
occupational achievement. I then evaluated the correlations between IQ and the 
conscientiousness measures in each of the progressively more selected samples.  
Evaluation of IRR formula 
The formula in Eq. 3.2 is a special case of Thorndike case III i.e. indirect selection. 
To evaluate whether the estimated correlations based on this formula tally with those in 
empirical data subject to selection, I applied the formula in Eq. 3.2 to the data at each level of 
selection. A lack of correspondence between the estimated and actual correlations would 
suggest that Eq. 3.2 has limited utility in predicting (and conversely, correcting for) the 




It was not possible to directly compare a moderation model with a model of 
compensatory selection directly in the sense of estimating both and comparing their fits. 
However, the absence of a moderation effect would suggest that any apparent compensatory 
selection effect was not really just due to an interaction between achievement and IQ.  I, 
therefore, also evaluated whether educational or occupational achievement moderated the 
effect of IQ on conscientiousness. To do this I used moderated multiple regression models. 
One model was estimated for each of the measures of conscientiousness in each of the 
samples. In these models the predictors were IQ, achievement (occupational level for the 
parent sample and GPA for the adolescent sample) and their product. The outcome variable 
was the conscientiousness measure (Control or Achievement-striving). IQ and achievement 
were both centred prior to analysis. A statistically significant interaction term was considered 
to be evidence in favour of moderation of the relation between IQ and conscientiousness by 
achievement.  
Results 
Correlations in unselected samples 
 In the unselected adolescent sample there was no statistically significant association 
between IQ and Control (r = .04, p = .06) but a statistically significant positive association 
between IQ and Achievement-striving (r = .14, p<.01). In the unselected parent sample there 
was a small but statistically significant positive association between IQ and Control (r = .05, 
p<.01) but no statistically significant association between IQ and Achievement-striving (r = 
.03, p = .15).  
Effect of selection on conscientiousness-IQ association 
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Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the correlations of IQ with the Control and Achievement-
striving personality scales when the full samples were subjected to selection on educational 
or occupational achievement. They show the downward trajectories of the correlations as 
samples became increasingly selected on achievement or occupational achievement. This is 
depicted graphically in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.   
Application of Thorndike case III 
 In the adolescent participants, the whole sample correlations between IQ and GPA, 
Control and GPA, and Achievement-striving and GPA were r=.38, r=.29 and r=.32 
respectively. The whole sample and selected sample variances are provided in Table 3.3 
together with the predicted correlations based on Thorndike case III formula. The predicted 
correlations were in most cases quite close to the actual correlations. Using Thorndike case 
III, a negative association between Control and IQ but not between Achievement-striving and 
IQ would have been predicted at the highest levels of selection.  
 In the parent participants, the whole sample correlations between IQ and occupational 
achievement, Control and occupational achievement, and Achievement-striving and 
occupational achievement were r=.40, r=.10 and r=.11 respectively. The whole sample and 
selected sample variances are provided in Table 3.4 together with the predicted correlations 
based on Thorndike case III formula. The predicted and actual correlations were for the most 
part similar, diverging only for the IQ-Achievement association and only at the highest level 
of selection. At very high levels of occupational achievement, the range restriction formula 
suggested only a very small negative correlation between Achievement-striving and IQ, 
however, a much larger negative correlation was observed empirically. This suggests that the 
association between occupational level and the combination of IQ and Achievement-striving 
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that facilitates occupational success is non-linear, possibly even substantively different at the 
highest levels of occupational achievement.  
Table 3.1: Correlations between IQ and conscientiousness at different levels of 







 R N P r N p 
No selection .04 2416 .06 .14 2417 <.01 
GPA>1 .03 2285 .09 .15 2285 <.01 
GPA>1.25 .03 2270 .11 .15 2270 <.01 
GPA>1.5 .03 2240 .14 .15 2239 <.01 
GPA>1.75 .03 2196 .20 .14 2195 <.01 
GPA>2 .02 2066 .47 .13 2065 <.01 
GPA>2.25 .00 1964 .92 .13 1963 <.01 
GPA>2.5 -.02 1758 .38 .12 1758 <.01 
GPA>2.75 -.02 1538 .48 .12 1539 <.01 
GPA>3 -.04 1236 .18 .10 1237 <.01 
GPA>3.25 -.05 1014 .08 .09 1014 <.01 
GPA>3.5 -.07 662 .07 .10 663 .01 







Table 3.2: Correlations between IQ and conscientiousness at different levels of 
selectivity for occupational achievement in adult sample 
Selection criterion IQ-Control correlation IQ-Achievement-striving 
correlation 
 r N P r N p 
0. No selection .05 3280 <.01 .03 3277 .15 
1. Semi-skilled and 
above 
.04 2332 .04 .01 2329 .61 
2. Skilled manual 
and above 
.03 2247 .15 .00 2090 .96 
3. Clerical, sales, 
technician etc. 
and above 












.03 269 .64 -.13 268 .03 
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Figure 3.1: Conscientiousness-IQ associations in adolescent sample 
 




Table 3.3: Application of Thorndike case III to adolescent sample correlations 
Selection 
criterion 




 GPA IQ Control Ach r r' r-r’ r r' r-r’ 
No selection .72 14.53 7.60 8.49 .04 .04 .00 .14 .14 .00 
GPA>1 .67 14.50 7.52 8.40 .03 .03 .00 .15 .13 .02 
GPA>1.25 .66 14.50 7.52 8.39 .03 .02 .01 .15 .12 .03 
GPA>1.5 .63 14.47 7.50 8.36 .03 .01 .02 .15 .11 .04 
GPA>1.75 .60 14.46 7.52 8.35 .03 .01 .02 .14 .11 .03 
GPA>2 .54 14.45 7.43 8.29 .02 -.01 .03 .13 .09 .04 
GPA>2.25 .50 14.45 7.45 8.22 .00 -.02 .02 .13 .08 .05 
GPA>2.5 .43 14.49 7.45 8.23 -.02 -.03 .01 .12 .07 .05 
GPA>2.75 .36 14.45 7.42 8.18 -.02 -.05 .03 .12 .05 .07 
GPA>3 .28 14.43 7.43 8.15 -.04 -.06 .02 .10 .04 .06 
GPA>3.25 .23 14.60 7.51 8.24 -.05 -.07 .02 .09 .03 .06 
GPA>3.5 .13 14.33 7.42 8.21 -.07 -.07 .00 .10 .03 .07 
GPA>3.75 0.00 14.18 7.40 7.85 -.06 -.08 .02 .08 .02 .06 
Note. r is empirical estimate, r’ is estimate based on  Thorndike Case III formula. Occ= Occupational 







Table 3.4: Application of Thorndike case III to parent sample correlations 
Selection 
criteria 




 Occ IQ Control Ach r r' r-r’ r r' r-r’ 
0. 1.64 14.21 7.19 7.80 .05 .05 .00 .03 .03 .00 
1. 1.52 14.22 7.24 7.68 .04 .04 .00 .01 .02 -.01 
2.  1.30 14.11 7.24 7.67 .03 .04 -.01 .00 .01 -.01 
3.  1.01 14.31 7.31 7.59 .02 .03 -.01 .01 .00 .00 
4.  0.77 14.16 7.42 7.46 .01 .02 -.01 -.05 .00 -.05 
5.  0.48 13.85 7.50 7.54 .01 .01 .00 -.05 -.01 -.04 
6.  0.00 12.95 7.82 7.94 .03 .01 .02 -.13 -.01 -.12 
Note. r is empirical estimate, r’ is estimate based on  Thorndike Case III formula. Occ= Occupational 
achievement, Ach= Achievement-striving. See Table 3.2 for selection criteria.  
In the adolescent sample, the initial non-significant positive association between IQ 
and Control in the full sample (r = .04, p = .06) became steadily attenuated and then negative 
with selection on GPA. At the highest level of GPA, the association was r = -.06 (p = .22). A 
similar albeit more subtle effect occurred in the correlation between IQ and Achievement-
striving, which began at r = .14 (p<.01) and decreased to r = .08 (p = .13) in the most selected 
group. 
In the parent sample, selection on occupational level had little effect on the correlation 
between IQ and Control. It reduced from .05 to .01 and then rose again to .03 at the highest 
level of selection. There was a more marked effect of selection on the correlation between IQ 
and Achievement-striving. With increasing degrees of selection, it first became steadily 
attenuated to zero with and then became negative. Although there was no significant 
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association between IQ and Achievement-striving in the full sample, at the highest level of 
selection there was a statistically significant negative association (r = -.13, p = .03).  
Moderation tests 
There was no statistically significant interaction between IQ and GPA in predicting 
either Control (b = 0.02, p = .32), or Achievement-striving (b = 0.04, p = .08) in the 
adolescent sample.  There was also no statistically significant interaction between IQ and 
occupational level in predicting either Control (b = -0.00, p = .86) or Achievement-striving (b 
= -0.00, p = .62) in the adult sample. These results suggest that achievement did not moderate 
the effect of IQ on conscientiousness.  
Discussion 
 In this chapter I tested whether compensatory selection into research samples could 
explain why negative associations have been observed between conscientiousness and 
cognitive ability. Often these associations are explained in terms of an ‘intelligence 
compensation hypothesis’ in which lower ability individuals develop higher levels of 
conscientiousness to compensate for their lower ability.  Many studies have, however, failed 
to find the expected negative associations between IQ and conscientiousness. Moreover, 
those that have tended to comprise participants above certain levels of educational or 
occupational achievement.  
I found no evidence for negative correlation in a large sample of adolescents and their 
parents. Unlike many previous studies, in this sample only relatively trivial selection on 
educational or occupational achievement was likely. Where there were significant 
associations between IQ and conscientiousness in the full sample, these were positive rather 
than negative. In fact, there was a positive correlation between IQ and Achievement-striving 
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(r =.14) of an absolute magnitude comparable to the negative correlations reported in 
previous studies cited in support of ICH (e.g. Moutafi et al., 2006).  
However, this was not the first study to report evidence contradicting ICH as others 
have found no significant association or small positive associations have been 
conscientiousness and IQ (Bartels et al., 2012; Lounsbury et al., 2005; Luciano et al., 2006). 
Notably, like the current study, many of these studies did not appear to show evidence of 
substantial sample selection on achievement.  
The general pattern of zero to small associations between IQ and conscientiousness in 
studies apparently not selected on achievement might suggest one of two causal scenarios at 
the level of the individual. Either there are only minimal causal impacts of IQ and 
conscientiousness on one another; or the impacts of IQ and conscientiousness on one another 
are heterogeneous across individuals but close to zero in the aggregate as effects in opposite 
directions cancel out. For example, while some individuals of lower ability may develop 
increased conscientiousness in compensation, others of low ability may become discouraged 
by their failure to achieve on a par with their more able peers without intensified efforts. 
These latter individuals may grow less conscientious in expending achievement-related effort 
in response to the lower pay-off they receive for this behaviour. Conversely, the higher 
rewards for behaving conscientiously in more able individuals could lead to greater 
reinforcement of this behaviour.  A person’s particular social environment (e.g. the rewards 
associated with intelligent and conscientious behaviour) in combination with their other traits 
(e.g. motivation, reward sensitivity, locus of control, expectations surrounding achievement) 
will likely also influence whether and how their level of intellectual ability and 
conscientiousness impact one another.  
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Soubelet and Salthouse (2011) have suggested that how personality traits and 
cognition relate to one another may depend on a person’s age. Our results support this idea to 
some degree: only in our adolescent sample was a positive association observed between 
Achievement-striving and IQ. A possible explanation for this is that adolescents are likely to 
be currently or recently in academic environments: social settings in which intellectual 
achievement is heavily measured and rewarded. The salience of intellectual achievement may 
foster social influences that result in enhancement of conscientiousness particularly in those 
individuals of higher cognitive ability for whom these rewards are more attainable, with 
individuals of lower cognitive ability possibly even becoming disheartened and demotivated. 
Such processes are likely to be governed by a ‘frog pond’ effect whereby it is not only the 
absolute level of intellectual ability of individuals that matters with regards to influences on 
conscientiousness, but also their levels of cognitive ability relative to immediate peers (e.g. 
see Marsh et al., 2007).  Therefore, individuals who perceive their potential for achievement 
to be more limited because of their relative and absolute cognitive ability would be less likely 
to strive towards these achievements and thus score lower on conscientiousness.  
The primary aim of this chapter was to assess the hypothesis that achievement 
truncation can account for previously observed negative associations between 
conscientiousness and ability.  Consistent with this, I found evidence that selecting on 
educational or occupational achievement biased the associations in the negative direction. In 
the adolescent sample, positive associations between IQ and the conscientiousness measures 
in the full sample were reduced to negative or effectively zero as subsamples were 
increasingly restricted to high levels of GPA. In the adult sample there was little effect of 
restricting the sample to increasingly high levels of occupational achievement on the 
correlation between IQ and Control. Restricting the sample in this way, however, induced a 
negative and statistically significant association between IQ and Achievement-striving in 
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spite of there being no significant association in the full sample. This negative association 
was of a similar magnitude to those interpreted as evidence for intelligence compensation in 
previous studies.  I also checked whether these apparent compensatory selection effects 
simply reflected unmodelled moderation of the relation between IQ and conscientiousness by 
achievement. Moderation effects were very small and non-significant, suggesting that this 
was not the case. I, therefore, interpreted results as suggesting that achievement truncation 
may have accounted for some previous observations of a negative association between 
conscientiousness-related traits and IQ. The fact that only in one out of the 4 cases examined 
were negative associations induced by selection suggests, however, that at most truncation 
contributes to, rather than completely explains the previously observed negative associations.  
Nonetheless, results suggested that differing degrees of selection on achievement could 
contribute to cross-study differences in the magnitude and direction of association between 
conscientiousness and IQ. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to ascertain from the study reports the precise 
selection processes that led participants to be in the research samples in which negative 
conscientiousness-IQ associations have been observed. For this reason, I cannot be certain 
that these processes were closely approximated by the simulated selection I used. This is a 
general problem in observational research:  it is uncommon for the selection processes 
leading to the composition of convenience samples to be explicitly considered, even less to 
be measured and modelled (see Hunt & Madhyastha, 2008 for a discussion). Unless such 
selection processes are given due consideration, researchers risk being misled as to the 
direction and magnitude of the associations between study variables.  
Finally, while I have argued in this chapter that variability in sample selectivity on 
achievement may explain some of the heterogeneity in association between conscientiousness 
and ability in the published literature, this will not be the only factor influencing the 
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magnitude of association. For example, different facets of conscientiousness appear to show 
varying associations with IQ and there may be plausible theoretical interpretations for these 
differential associations (e.g. Luciano et al., 2006). For example, the ‘Competence’ facet of 
Conscientiousness measures may be more positively related to IQ than other facets if it 
essentially acts as a self-report measure of IQ (e.g. see Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2005).  
Similarly, I have argued here that Achievement-striving may be particularly influenced by IQ 
because motivation to achieve is likely to be influenced by self-perceptions of capacity to 
achieve. Depending on which facets are measured and whether these are combined into a 
single Conscientiousness score will, therefore, affect the observed association with IQ.  
Finally, the measures of occupational and educational achievement were imperfect. 
Both scales were coarse and self-reported. Replicating results using alternative sources of 
information regarding achievement would be valuable. For example, having teacher ratings 
or school records in the case of GPA would help to ensure that results were not overly 











Chapter 4: A comparison of alternative phenotypic proxies in tests of gene-environment 
interactions under construct truncation 
The previous chapters have considered construct truncation due to person selection; 
however, item selection may be an equally important source of construct truncation. One area 
where construct truncation due to item selection is particularly important is when the 
construct is hypothesised as the outcome of an interaction. Here, construct truncation can 
result in significant distortions of estimates of the interactive process, even reversing its 
apparent direction.  In this chapter, I used a simulation study complemented by a real data 
example to evaluate three possible methods of dealing with this problem in the context of 
testing gene-environment interactions.  
Gene-environment interactions 
Increasingly, theoretical perspectives on phenotypic development and expression are 
recognising that genes and environments transact in dynamic and complicated ways.  Many 
posit some kind of gene-environment interaction (GxE) where GxE is defined as a 
differential response to environmental circumstances depending on genotype, or, a 
differential genetic expression depending on environment (Boomsma, & Martin, 2002; 
Eaves, Last, Marin, & Jinks, 1977).  GxE plays a central role in major theoretical models 
such as the diathesis-stress model, the differential susceptibility model, the vantage 
sensitivity model, and the bioecological model (Brofenbrenner & Ceci, 1994; Pluess & 
Belsky, 2013; Reiss, Leve, & Neiderhiser, 2013; Rende & Plomin, 1992). The diathesis-stress 
model, for example, predicts that the genetic variance in a psychopathological trait is greater 
in more adverse environments whereas the bioecological model predicts that the genetic 
potential for a positive trait, such as intellectual ability, is realised to a greater extent in a 
more stimulating, higher quality environment (Asbury, Wachs, & Plomin, 2005; Rende & 
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Plomin, 1992). GxEs are also cited as mechanisms by which social factors regulate 
behaviour, for example, in the theory that genetic influences on certain phenotypes are 
prevented from being expressed in environments where there are stronger social norms or 
explicit prohibitions relating to those phenotypes (Shanahan & Hofer, 2005).  
Construct truncation in gene-environment interactions 
To keep pace with these theoretical developments, it has been necessary to develop 
statistical methodologies capable of modelling the more complex forms of interplay implied 
by theory (e.g. Purcell, 2002). Despite the promise and widespread uptake of these 
approaches, the ability to test theoretically implied GxE interactions is hampered in practice 
by dependency of tests of interactions on the observed distributions and scales of the 
phenotype (Eaves et al., 1977, 2002; Eaves, 2006; Mather & Jinks, 1971; Purcell, 2002; 
Schwabe & van den Berg, 2014).  
The problem of dependency of GxE on the scaling of the phenotype has been known 
since the time of R.A. Fisher noted that GxE interactions could be manipulated by re-scaling 
the variables involved. In fact, he went so far as to advocate ‘transformations of scale’ to 
eliminate what he perceived to be nuisance non-additivity (Tabery, 2008). This suggestion 
was controversial because he was recommending purging the same non-additivity that was, 
and still is, viewed by many substantive researchers as a meaningful clue as to the causal 
processes underlying phenotypic development. Since then, numerous methodological studies 
have further discussed and demonstrated the dependency of appearance of presence of GxE 
on scaling (Eaves et al., 1977; Martin, 2000; Molenaar, van der Sluis, Boomsma, & Dolan, 
2012; Purcell, 2002; Tucker-Drob, Harden, & Turkheimer, 2009; van der Sluis, Dolan, Neale, 
Boomsma, & Posthuma, 2006). In the section that follows I summarise and extend the key 
arguments of these authors.  
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The key challenge is in the multiplicity of possible causal structures underlying the 
same sample phenotypic distribution. Consider the case where the observed distribution of 
the phenotype is non-normal: a common occurrence in behaviour genetic research, as well as 
psychological research in general (Beasley, Erickson, & Allison, 2009; Miccerri, 1989). The 
primary problem for testing GxE is that when an observed phenotypic distribution is non-
normal, this non-normality could reflect the presence of GxE, or it could simply be that the 
population distribution of the phenotype is normal but its measurement is poorly scaled so 
that the observed distribution does not reflect the population distribution. A statistical test of 
GxE will not be able to distinguish these possibilities.  
This difficulty is not one limited to a choice between a ‘GxE’ explanation and a 
‘scaling’ explanation. There are many biologically plausible alternative models that can 
produce similar patterns in observed data and, in turn, similar model fits when formally 
tested. For example, a non-linear main effect of one variable on another is difficult to 
distinguish statistically from GxE (Rathouz et al., 2008). However, in the current thesis, I 
focus on scaling specifically because there is considerable evidence that at a large number of 
phenotypic measures may be vulnerable to the effects of suboptimal scaling.  
 Cases in point are measures of traits which originated in psychopathological 
paradigms. These very commonly yield observed non-normal (positively skewed) 
distributions because majorities of participants score close to the low (non-pathological) ends 
of the measurement scales.  It is often argued that these observed distributions are not 
necessarily appropriate representations of the population distributions of the phenotypes but 
arise as a result of the scales being developed with focus on the upper extremes of the traits 
(van den Oord, Pickles, & Waldman, 2003;van den Oord et al., 2000).  Thus, failure to 
observe a normal distribution for a trait may be a result of failing to measure that trait with 
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items that have an appropriate range of difficulties to provide reliable coverage of the whole 
trait distribution.  
This position is supported by the observation that even when a case can be made that 
a clinical or personality trait has a continuous normal distribution in the population, measures 
of that  trait often exhibit  item difficulties that are tightly clustered in the impaired range 
(Meijer & Egberink, 2012; Thomas, 2011). These scales have high discrimination in and 
around clinical cut-off points but poor discrimination in the healthy ranges. Thus, in a 
population-representative sample that would include predominantly healthy participants, 
most participants completing such a test will endorse the lowest response options for most 
items, leading to a positively skewed score distribution and an apparent lack of individual 
differences at low levels of the phenotype. If raw scores, such as the sum of items from a 
scale affected in this way, are used to represent the phenotype, they may provide biased tests 
of GxE (Molenaar & Dolan, 2014;Schwabe & van den Berg, 2014). This is because GxE 
estimates depend on the degrees of individual differences in a phenotype at different levels of 
the moderator. The use of a scale that fails to capture such differences adequately at lower 
levels of the phenotype may falsely indicate less variation at lower levels, when in fact this 
apparent observation is a function of weaker measurement at lower levels. The direction of 
the resulting bias in GxE depends on both skewness of the score and extent of correlation 
with the moderator. Positive skewness and a positive moderator-phenotype correlation is 
liable to produce a positive interaction parameter, while negative skewness and a positive 
moderator-phenotype correlation is liable to produce a negative interaction parameter.  
Compounding this problem is the fact that most behaviour genetic modelling 
approaches require assumptions of multivariate normality1. With this in mind, researchers 
have tended to respond to observing non-normal phenotypic distributions by employing 
straightforward non-linear transformations intended to remove the non-normality. For 
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positively skewed sum scores, the log-transformation is popular (e.g Hicks, South, DiRago, 
Iacono, & McGue, 2009; Johnson et al., 2010) but the square root transformation is also 
sometimes used (e.g. Distel et al., 2011). Given that the same approach is recommended to 
remove GxE interactions that are artifacts of phenotypic scaling (e.g. see Falconer & 
MacKay, 1996 ch.17), one might conclude that this also represents a solution to the problem 
of dependency of GxE on scale. There are, however, at least two major reasons to doubt this. 
First, while there has been no systematic simulation study evaluating their effectiveness in 
mitigating bias due to sub-optimal scaling, Kang & Waller (2005) demonstrated that sum 
score transformations were only moderately successful in reducing the tendency towards 
spurious phenotypic interactions in the context of moderated multiple regression. Second, and 
more importantly: presence of GxE introduces non-normality into the phenotypic distribution 
because it is by definition a relative expansion or contraction of variance in the phenotype 
across levels of the moderator. This suggests that transforming a non-normal score to 
normality could ‘transform away’ the very interaction effect of potential interest.  
 As another possible solution, some authors have suggested explicitly separating out 
these two sources of non-normality by modelling GxE using an explicit measurement model 
(the scaling part) in combination with a biometric model (the GxE part). Essentially, the 
proposal is to model the scaling properties of items to account for differences in 
informativeness of phenotypic estimates across levels of the moderator. For example, if a 
scale has items that have difficulties that are clustered towards one end of the scale, a 
psychometric model with potential to recognize this can be integrated into a broader 
biometric model so that these parameters can be freely estimated and reflected in the 
estimates of the biometric parameters. The particular choice of measurement model will vary 
from phenotype to phenotype and be dictated by expectations about the latent trait 
distribution and the item response format.  
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For continuous indicators, Molenaar et al. (2012) demonstrated the feasibility of this 
approach in a GxE model in which GxE was operationalised as heteroscedastic E or C 
variance across levels of A. They showed that when differences in item residual variances 
across phenotypic level were incorporated into a measurement model and combined with a 
test of GxE, biasing effects of poor scaling were substantially mitigated. Similarly, Tucker-
Drob et al. (2009) suggested a procedure in which a factor model with quadratic factor 
loadings was estimated in one stage and then, in a second stage, the same measurement 
model (with parameters fixed to the values estimated from the first stage) was combined with 
Purcell’s GxE model.  Quadratic factor loadings allow for the relation between the items and 
latent phenotype to vary across levels of the phenotype: an effect that could otherwise be mis-
attributed to GxE. 
However, truly continuous indicators are rare; therefore, Molenaar and Dolan (2014) 
and Schwabe and van den Berg (2014) proposed models for (ordered) categorical data that 
could be combined with a test of GxE. Again, using these models there was evidence of 
substantial reduction of bias in tests of GxE compared to using biometric models that did not 
explicitly model the scaling properties of the items used to measure the phenotype. 
In spite of the potential utility of incorporating explicit measurement models for the 
phenotype into tests of GxE when an assumption about the underlying distribution of the 
genetic and environmental influences on the phenotype can be made, there have been very 
few studies taking this approach. One reason may be that the approach is mathematically 
complex and thus somewhat inaccessible for non-methodologists. There may also be a 
misconception that, because scores from these models will be highly correlated with sum 
scores, there would be essentially no benefit from using such models. It is not valid, however, 
to conclude that highly correlated measures will have the same properties in regression-based 
models, and particularly not in tests of interactions such as GxE. This is because correlations 
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are sensitive mainly to rank orders, which can be highly preserved even when distributional 
properties differ markedly. Distributional properties are particularly important in any 
situation involving any kind of nonlinearity such as that involved in interactions. 
Misconceptions aside, there are practical limitations to the various approaches 
discussed above, and it is not clear what the best approach might be. For example, the 
Schwabe and van den Berg (2014) approach requires assumption that IRT parameters are 
known, the Molenaar and Dolan (2014) approach is computationally intensive, and the 
approaches of Molenaar et al. (2012) and Tucker-Drob et al. (2009) require continuous 
indicators. 
 Given these potential practical limitations, another possibility is to use a two-step 
approach to estimating GxE.  In this approach, an appropriate measurement model for the 
phenotype is estimated and factor scores are obtained from this model, and then these factor 
scores are submitted to a biometric model to test GxE. The ‘two steps’ refer to the use of two 
separate models, and the approximation involved in using explicitly calculated factor scores 
to measure a variable conceptualized as latent. This is in contrast to the one-step approach 
described above in which the biometric and psychometric model are estimated together, in a 
single step. 
  Although there has been no systematic study of this approach in GxE models, 
simulation studies have shown that a two-step approach works well in reducing bias due to 
scaling in phenotypic-level interactions in  moderated multiple regression and factorial 
ANOVA (Embreston, 1996; Kang & Waller, 2005; Morse, Johanson & Griffeth, 2012). For 
example, Kang and Waller (2005) showed that the tendency for spurious interactions to result 
from poor item scaling was substantially mitigated when IRT scores from a 2-parameter 
logistic model were utilised in place of sum scores. This strategy also proved more effective 
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than a simple non-linear transformation of the score. Therefore, it is possible that a two-step 
approach could provide a compromise between the greater conceptual and computational 
simplicity of using a sum score and the effectiveness of IRT-based latent trait estimates in 
accounting for the scaling properties of items.   
Based on the preceding argument, I compared a two-step approach to the currently 
most commonly used methods for handling observed non-normal phenotypes, that is, the raw 
sum scores and the transformed sum scores. I compared these three approaches using a 
statistical simulation study complemented by a real data example. 
Modelling approach 
 I based analyses on the GxM (gene by ‘measured environment’) framework initially 
introduced by Purcell (2002) and subsequently extended and evaluated by others (Rathouz, 
van Hulle, Rodgers, Waldman, & Lahey, 2008, van Hulle, Lahey, & Rathouz, 2013; Zheng & 
Rathouz, 2013). This framework is arguably the foremost in assessing theoretical hypotheses 
which predict moderation of genetic influences on a specific phenotype by a specific 
moderator because in addition to accommodating both gene-environment interaction and 
gene-environment correlation, it can also be used to evaluate a range of other forms of 
phenotype-moderator transactions (see Zheng & Rathouz, 2013).  Uptake of the GxM 
modelling approach has been extensive; it has been employed to assess substantive 
hypotheses relating to a diversity of phenotypes including cognitive ability (Harden, 
Turkheimer, & Loehlin, 2007), physical health (Johnson & Krueger, 2005), health behaviours 
(Timberlake et al., 2006), social relationships (South, Krueger, Johnson, & Iacono, 2008), 
and psychopathological traits (South & Kruger, 2011). The popularity and influence of the 
approach is indicated by the fact that, at time of writing, the Purcell (2002) article has been 
cited almost 500 times.  
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I focussed on a form of the model that can be used to assess gene-by-measured 
environment interaction. The moderator (M) is modelled as: 




and the phenotype (P) as: 
P = (aC + αCM)AM  + (cC + γCM)CM + (eC + εCM)EM 
+ (aU + αUM)AU + (cU + γUM)CU  + (eU + εUM)EU ,         
(4.2) 
where 𝐴, 𝐶  and 𝐸 refer to mutually uncorrelated multivariate normally distributed latent 
additive genetic, shared environmental and unshared environmental influences respectively, 
α, γ and ε are moderation parameters that capture the moderation of A, C and E influences by 
M, with the subscripts C and U denoting ‘common’ (to P and M) and ‘unique’ (to P). 
 The parameter of interest is αU which captures the moderation of the genetic 
influences on the phenotype that are not shared with the moderator. When this parameter is 
positive, genetic influences unique to the phenotype increase with the moderator and when it 
is negative, they decrease with the moderator.  
Simulation study 
I evaluated the effect of poor scaling on estimates of αU  using Eqs. 4.1 and 4.2 as our 
population biometric model, simulating poor scaling of the phenotype (explained below), and 
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then estimating the model in Eqs. 4.1 and 4.2 using this poorly scaled phenotype. For the 
population biometric model, I used the following parameter magnitudes: For the moderator 
and phenotypic means I set 𝜇𝑀 = 𝜇𝑃 = 0;  for the latent genetic and environmental influences 
on the moderator and phenotype I set  𝑎𝑈=√0.2 ,     𝑎𝐶 = √0.3 , 𝑎𝑀 = √0.3; 𝑐𝑈 = √0.1, 𝑐𝐶 =
√0.1,  𝑐𝑀 = √0.2;  𝑒𝑈=√0.2 , 𝑒𝐶 = √0.1 , 𝑒𝑀 = √0.5 ; and for the moderation parameters I set 
𝛼𝐶 = 𝛾𝐶 = 𝜀𝐶 = 0 and varied the magnitude of 𝛼𝑈, 𝛾𝑈 and 𝜀𝑈 across conditions. To explore 
how bias in 𝛼𝑈 was affected by direction of the skewness of the observed score distribution 
and direction of the population interaction, I varied 𝛼𝑈 = to be -.15, 0, and .15 across 
conditions. In addition, as resolvability of the  𝛼𝑈, 𝛾𝑈, and 𝜀𝑈 parameters is often imperfect, I 
explored how the bias in 𝛼𝑈 is affected by whether 𝛾𝑈 and 𝜀𝑈 represented interactions in the 
same versus the opposite direction to that of 𝛼𝑈. I did this by including a subset of conditions 
in which 𝛾𝑈 and 𝜀𝑈 were specified to have the same sign as 𝛼𝑈 and a subset of conditions in 
which they were specified to have the opposite sign to 𝛼𝑈. In both cases the absolute 
magnitudes of 𝛾𝑈 and 𝜀𝑈 were specified to be .20 and .08 respectively while 𝛼𝑈 was held 
constant at -.15.  Together, this combination of population parameters resulted in a total of 
four population models, summarised in Table 4.2. In each replication, I generated data for 
500 MZ and 500 DZ twins according to these models.  
I selected parameter magnitudes representing realistic values from previous empirical 
studies.  Because results could be expected to be broadly symmetrical for positive and 
negative skews and negative and positive interaction parameters, I did not implement a fully 
crossed simulation design, but focussed on models that were realistic and which covered key 
combinations of variables.  
Observed data generation 
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  I generated item level data for twin 1 and twin 2 separately using a graded response 
model (GRM; Samejima, 1969) as the basis for linking the latent trait values for the 
phenotype (P) to observed item responses. An identical GRM model was used for twin 1 and 
twin 2. This allowed the same model to apply to all individuals in the sample while also 
having the advantage of allowing any complications due to clustering within twin pairs to be 
circumvented. These latent trait values were determined according to the GxM population 
models described in the previous section.  I simulated these data using the catIrt package in R 
statistical software (Nydeck, 2014; R Core Team, 2014).  In the GRM, the items are 
essentially considered in dichotomous steps, each characterised by a 2-parameter logistic 
model but with discriminations constrained equal within items. Specifically, probability of a 
respondent i with level of the latent trait 𝜃𝑖 having a response xij that falls at or above a given 
category (k = 1…mj) is specified as: 
𝑃∗𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑃(𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑘|𝜃𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗, 𝛽𝑗𝑘) =
1
1 + exp [−𝛼𝑗(𝜃𝑖 − 𝛽𝑗𝑘)]
 
(4.3) 
where αj is the discrimination parameter of item j and βjk is the category difficulty parameter 
of category k in item j. 
I generated data for 20 items with 𝛼𝑗 and  𝛽𝑗𝑘 parameters provided in Table 4.1.
79 
 
Table 4.1: Parameter values for IRT model used in simulation 
Item 𝒂 𝜷𝟏 𝜷𝟐 𝜷𝟑 𝜷𝟒 
1 1.94 -0.27 0.84 2.23 2.74 
2 1.93 -0.21 1.46 2.01 2.73 
3 1.96 -0.11 1.50 2.38 2.82 
4 2.13 -0.36 1.29 2.07 2.65 
5 1.09 0.34 1.16 2.07 2.73 
6 1.13 -0.15 1.34 2.00 2.78 
7 0.87 0.34 0.99 2.34 2.64 
8 0.99 0.23 0.68 2.33 2.62 
9 1.63 0.43 0.98 2.22 2.83 
10 1.01 0.04 1.22 2.39 2.73 
11 1.75 0.10 0.93 2.27 2.63 
12 0.80 0.01 0.67 2.20 2.75 
13 0.67 0.37 1.49 2.42 2.67 
14 1.91 0.13 0.89 2.29 2.92 
15 1.06 0 1.29 2.09 2.96 
16 0.55 0.50 0.76 2.32 2.81 
17 1.88 -0.24 1.02 2.07 2.74 
18 2.44 -0.40 0.80 2.09 2.86 
19 0.90 -0.11 1.27 2.27 2.73 
20 1.15 -0.24 0.65 2.17 2.73 
Note. 𝒂 is an item discrimination parameter, 𝜷𝟏 -𝜷𝟒 are threshold parameters.  
The  𝛽𝑗𝑘 parameters were chosen to yield positively skewed item and sum score 
distributions that mimicked those commonly found in empirical research (e.g. Kang & 
Waller, 2005). To do this, I selected 𝛽𝑗𝑘 for successive  response categories so that a 
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disproportionate number of responses would fall into the first and second response categories.  
I also specified the 𝛽𝑗𝑘 parameters for a given category to show variability across the 20 
items within our simulated test which is more realistic than setting them all equal. 
Discrimination parameters, αj, were selected by randomly sampling from a uniform 
distribution with min = 0.5 and max = 2.5. 
 True score 
 As a control condition, I generated scores for the phenotype according to Eqs. 4.1 and 
4.2 without introducing any scaling issues. These scores can therefore be considered ‘true’ 
phenotypic scores. I considered these true phenotypic scores in order to provide a baseline 
against which I could compare the results. This is necessary because even in the absence of 
any scaling problems, it is likely that the GxM model will not perfectly recover all 
moderation parameters and because moderation parameters may be difficult to resolve from 
one another. For example, moderation of shared environmental influence may be to some 
extent mis-attributed to moderation of genetic influences. 
Sum score 
I created  sum scores for the phenotype summing the scores from the 20 items 
generated as described above by Eqs 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. An example of a resulting sum score 
distribution is shown in Figure 4.1. It illustrates that the choice of GRM parameters in Table 
4.2 yielded a sum score distribution exhibiting moderate positive skewness, similar to that 
observed in many measures of psychopathological traits. Skewness also depended on the 
direction of the interaction in the population model, with positive interactions making score 
distributions more positively skewed and negative interactions making score distributions 
more negatively skewed. However, these effects were relatively minor in comparison to the 






Histogram showing the distribution of the sum score derived from generating item level data 
according to Eq. 4.3 with parameters in Table 4.1.  
Transformed sum score 
I created transformed sum scores for the phenotypes using a log10 transformation. 
This, the natural log transformation and other similar kinds of transformations of the 
phenotype are commonly used in GxE models when the phenotype has a positively skewed 
distribution (e.g. Button et al., 2010; Hicks, Dirago, Iacono, & McGue, 2009; Hicks et al., 
2009; Johnson et al., 2010; Silvetoinen et al., 2009; Tuvblad, Grann, & Lichtenstein, 2006). 






Histogram showing the distribution of the transformed sum score derived from generating item 
level data according to Eq. 4.3 with parameters in Table 4.1 and then applying a log10 
transformation.  
 IRT scores 
I obtained factor scores by fitting an IRT model to the item data and using the 
resulting item parameters to estimate IRT-based individual phenotype scores, usually referred 
to as ‘factor scores’ (Chalmers, 2012). To estimate item parameters, I fit a graded response 
model to the data. As I originally generated the data according to a graded response model, I 
knew this was the appropriate measurement model, however, in real applications this choice 
should be based on considerations of the response format of items and the likely form of 
relations between item responses and the latent phenotype.  I then computed IRT-based 
estimates of the phenotypic level for each individual in the sample by combining information 
from their patterns of item scores with the estimated item parameters from fitting the graded 
83 
 
response model, specifically, using Expected a Posteriori (EAP) scoring (Embretson & Reise, 
2000).  EAP scoring is a Bayesian approach based on finding the mean of a posterior 
distribution representing the likelihood of phenotypic scores given a response pattern. The 
posterior distribution is computed by multiplying the prior distribution (likelihoods of 
phenotypic levels occurring in the population) by the likelihood of the observed response 
pattern given the phenotypic level (Embretson & Reise, 2000).  This method was selected 
among available factor score estimation approaches because it is easy to implement and 
available in most IRT software packages. In context of the models used here in which the 
trait of interest is uni-dimensional and the sample size large, I anticipated that other 
commonly used scoring methods such as maximum a posteriori (MAP) scoring or maximum 
likelihood estimates (ML) would perform similarly to EAP. Unlike using sum scores as a 
proxy for the phenotype, this method takes into account the scaling properties of the items. 
For example, in an IRT model in which items differ in discrimination, each item’s 
contribution to the sum score will depend on its discrimination. Estimating factor scores in 





Histogram showing the approximate distribution of factor scores derived from generating item 
level data according to Eq. 3 with parameters in Table 4.1, fitting a graded response model, and 
then obtaining factor scores based on this model. 
Summary of simulation conditions 
 The combination of GxE interaction parameters (αU, = -.15 vs 0 vs .15), other 
interaction parameters (γU = .20 and εU = .08 vs  γU = -.20 and εU = -.08), and score type (true, 
sum, transformed, IRT) resulted in  16 simulation conditions. These are outlined in Table 4.2. 
I generated 100 datasets for each condition to give 100 replications per condition. 
Model fitting 
To the 100 simulated datasets for each simulation condition (see Table 4.2), I fit the 
GxM model described in Eqs. 1-2. I fit the models in Mx (Neale, Boker, Xie, & Maes, 2006) 
using maximum likelihood estimation, making use of the script accompanying Purcell (2002) 
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which the author has made available on his website 
(http://pngu.mgh.harvard.edu/~purcell/gxe/). All latent A,C and E variances and covariances 
were freely estimated, αC, γC, and εC were fixed to zero, and αU,  γU and εU were freely 
estimated. In other words, the model I fit to each dataset was consistent with the true model. 
The main parameter of interest was αU, which captures the moderation of the additive genetic 
variance unique to the phenotype by M. However, because this parameter may not be 
completely resolvable from γU and εU, I recorded the mean and SD estimates across the 100 
replications for all three moderation parameters across each condition. Parameter bias was the 
difference between the population magnitude and the mean estimated value across the 100 
replications within a condition. In addition, I conducted a likelihood ratio test (comparing a 
model in which αU was freely estimated to one in which it was constrained to zero) for each 
replication to evaluate the statistical significance of the αU, parameter. Based on these, I 
computed false positive and false negative rates across the 100 replications. False negative 
rate was defined as the proportion of replications in which αU, was non-significant in the 
presence of a non-zero population parameter. False positive rate was defined as the 
proportion of replications in which: a) αU was significant in the presence of a null population 
parameter or b) αU was statistically significant but its value was in the opposite direction to 
its population value (e.g. negative sample value with a positive population value).  
Simulation Study Results 
 Simulation study results are provided in Table 4.2. For the ‘true scores’, the αU 
parameters were generally recovered well. Power to detect moderation was high and greatest 
when it was in the same direction as the main effects and the γU and εU parameters.   
Sum scores conditions 
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 In all conditions in which a poorly scaled sum score was used as the phenotype (‘sum 
score’ rows of Table 4.2), there was positive bias in the αU parameter, with γU and εU also 
tending to be affected in the same way. The positive biases occurred because the IRT 
parameters used to generate the data produced positively skewed sum scores. Had item 
parameters been selected to produce a negatively skewed sum scores, negative biases would 
have occurred. Positive αU bias was largest in conditions in which the true moderation 
parameter was in the opposite direction from the direction of skew (i.e. a negative or null 
population moderation parameter with a positively skewed score) and the other moderation 
parameters. Here the biasing effects of scaling and imperfect resolvability of the αU and γU  
parameters seemed to show effects which combined to give a larger overall positive bias. The 
false positive rate using sum scores was also high. This suggests that significant moderation 
detected using poorly scaled sum scores cannot not be trusted. 
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Table 4.2: Performance of sum score, transformed score and IRT score latent trait proxies under different population biometric models 
























ac cc ec αU γU εU 
True √. 3 √. 1 √. 1 .15 .20 .08 0 0.15 (0.04) 0.00 98% 0% 0.18 (0.05) -0.01 0.08 (0.02) 0.00 
True  √. 3 √. 1 √. 1 -
.15 
.20 .08 0 -0.12 (0.05) +0.03 75% 0% 0.19 (0.04) -0.01 0.07 (0.01) -0.01 
True  √. 3 √. 1 √. 1 0 .20 .08 0 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 N/A 0% 0.19 (0.03) -0.01 0.08 (0.02) 0.00 






0 -0.15 (0.05) 0.00 96% 0% 0.16 (0.08) -0.04 -0.08 
(0.02) 
0.00 
Sum  √. 3 √. 1 √. 1 .15 .20 .08 0 0.22 (0.05) +0.07 94% 0% 0.17 (0.07) -0.03 0.15 (0.02) +0.07 
Sum  √. 3 √. 1 √. 1 -
.15 
.20 .08 0 0.03 (0.08) +0.18 9% 1% 0.21 (0.05) +0.01 0.15 (0.02) +0.07 
Sum  √. 3 √. 1 √. 1 0 .20 .08 0 0.14 (0.07) +0.14 N/A 54% 0.18 (0.08) +0.02 0.15 (0.02) +0.08 






0 -0.06 (0.05) +0.09 15% 0% 0.00 (0.10) +0.20 0.05 (0.02) +0.13 
Transformed  √. 3 √. 1 √. 1 .15 .20 .08 0 0.16 (0.03) +0.01 73% 0% 0.15 (0.04) -0.05 0.06 (0.01) -0.02 
Transformed  √. 3 √. 1 √. 1 -
.15 
.20 .08 0 -0.02 (0.05) +0.13 4% 0% 0.11 (0.05) -0.09 0.06 (0.02) -0.02 
Transformed  √. 3 √. 1 √. 1 0 .20 .08 0 0.08 (0.04) +0.08 N/A 23% 0.12 (0.04) -0.08 0.05 (0.02) -0.03 













√. 3 √. 1 √. 1 .15 .20 .08 0 0.16 (0.04) +0.01 80% 0% 0.15 (0.05) -0.05 0.05 (0.01) -0.03 
IRT  √. 3 √. 1 √. 1 -
.15 
.20 .08 0 -0.06 (0.05) +0.09 13% 0% 0.16 (0.04) -0.04 0.06 (0.02) -0.02 
IRT  √. 3 √. 1 √. 1 0 .20 .08 0 0.06 (0.05) +0.02 N/A 16% 0.14 (0.05) -0.06 0.06 (0.02) -0.02 











aFalse positive rate defined as significant effect in opposite direction to population  parameter or significant effect in any direction when population parameter is zero. 
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Transformed sum scores conditions 
 Overall, there was positive bias in αU using transformed sum scores, especially in the 
condition in which the true moderation parameter was in the opposite direction to both the 
direction of skew and the other moderation parameters. The effect of transforming the sum 
score to normality was to pull the αU parameter in the negative direction. This represented a 
reduction in bias relative to using the untransformed sum score. Effectiveness of the 
transformation for reducing bias varied across conditions:  it almost eliminated the mild bias 
in the condition in which all moderation parameters were in the same direction as the scaling 
effects but moderate to substantial positive bias remained in the other conditions and GxE 
was under-estimated. Under-estimation of GxE effects meant that power to detect GxE was 
substantially reduced, particularly in the condition in which the GxE was in the opposite 
direction to the main and other moderation effects. Here, the true positive rate dropped from 
75% for the true scores to only 4% for the transformed sum scores.   However, transforming 
the sum scores to normality had the benefit of producing a marked reduction in false positive 
rate. When the population parameter was zero the false positive rate was only 23% when 
using a transformed sum score, compared with 54% when using a raw sum score. 
IRT scores conditions 
Overall, using factor scores from an appropriate IRT model as the phenotypic proxy 
(rows labelled ‘IRT score’ in Table 4.2) gave less biased αU parameter estimates than either 
raw or transformed sum scores., however, some positive bias remained in all cases. This bias 
was most pronounced in the condition in which the αU parameter was in the opposite 
direction to the scaling problems and the other moderation parameters (+.09) but minimal 
(+.01 to +.02) in the other conditions. The power to detect GxE was lower when using an IRT 
score in the corresponding true score conditions but higher than when using a transformed 
sum score.  The false positive rate also compared favourably to that obtained using a 
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transformed sum score (16% compared with 23% in when using transformed sum scores) but 
unfortunately, remained above nominal levels (i.e. 5%).  
Real Data Example 
Participants 
 To provide a real data example, I used data from the Minnesota Twin Registry 
(MTR), a comprehensive description of which can be found in Krueger and Johnson (2004). 
The full MTR includes data from twin pairs born in Minnesota in one of three year ranges. It 
includes 4307 twin pairs born between 1936 and 1955, 901 twin pairs born between 1904 and 
1943, and 391 male twin pairs born between 1961 and 1964. Eligible participants were 
identified from birth records, located, and invited to participate via mail. Additional 
incentives and invitations to participate were offered to those who did not initially respond. 
Zygosity determination was by self-reported similarity in eye colour, hair colour, overall 
appearance, and the difficulties others had in distinguishing two members of a pair. Analysis 
of a sub-sample of 74 twin pairs who underwent zygosity determination by serological 
analysis suggested that the self-report method had an estimated accuracy of 96%.  
Different subsets of the total MTR received different sets of measures. Data used in 
the current study were from 528 monozygotic twin pairs and 411 dizygotic twin pairs 
comprising 614 males and 1264 females who had completed measures of both personality 
and leisure time interests. The mean age of the sample was 37.11 (SD = 7.8).  
Measures 
Moderator 
 As the moderator variable, I used a composite of items from the Minnesota Leisure 
Time Interest Test (MLTIT; Lykken et al., 1990). The scale asks participants to rate the 
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extent to which they would be interested in pursuing a given activity assuming no time, 
health, or financial constraints. Participants rated their interest on a 5-point scale from 1 = 
‘No interest at all’ to 5 = ‘I would certainly do this’. In total, 120 activities were rated, but I 
selected 6 items to form an ‘Intellectual Interests’ scale. Selected items refer to the following 
activities: reading current non-fiction, taking a college course, reading literary classics, 
visiting galleries/museums/exhibitions, reading books/magazines or watching TV programs 
on science, and reading history/philosophy/biography. I checked that these items formed a 
reasonable uni-dimensional scale by fitting a single factor confirmatory factor model to the 
data from twin 1 of each twin pair. I used the Weighted Least Squares Means and Variances 
(WLSMV) in estimator in Mplus 7.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2010) to account for the categorical 
item response format. Fit statistics and parameter estimates suggested that, according to 
conventional criteria, it would be reasonable to combine the items into a single scale: the 6 
items all showed standardised loadings of .50 or greater and yielded a good-fitting single 
factor model (RMSEA = .05, CFI = .99, TLI = .99, WRMR = 0.56).. I therefore used the 
unweighted sum score of these six items as our moderator variable. Cronbach’s alpha of the 
scale was .63. 
Phenotype 
As the phenotypes I used personality scales from the 300-item Multidimensional 
Personality Questionnaire (MPQ; Tellegen & Waller, 2008). Participants were administered a 
version of the MPQ using a 2-point response scale. Items are phrased as statements to which 
participants answer ‘True’ or ‘False’ depending on whether they believe the statement 
describes their attitudes, opinions, interests or other characteristics. 
I selected two scales that yielded oppositely skewed scores. First, I used the 
negatively skewed ‘Well-being’ scale comprising 18 items. High scores on this scale are 
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presumed to be indicative of a cheerful and happy disposition, feeling good about oneself, 
being optimistic, and enjoying an interesting and exciting life. Second, I used the positively 
skewed ‘Aggression’ scale comprising 18 items.  High scores on this scale are presumed to 
be indicative of physical aggression, enjoyment of scenes of violence or upsetting or 
frightening others, victimisation of others for personal advantage, and vindictive and 
retaliatory tendencies.  
I varied how each phenotype was operationalised across conditions to mirror our 
simulation conditions. First, I used the raw sum score from each scale. Second, I used a 
transformation of the sum score that yielded an approximately normal distribution. Third, I 
used an IRT score for each scale. For this, I used a 2-parameter logistic model with a 
procedure otherwise identical to that described in the simulation study to estimate factor 
scores.  
Model fitting 
Model fitting broadly followed the procedure outlined in the simulation. However, 
because I was working with real data, I did not know the true model and, therefore, relied on 
model fit comparisons to guide model selection.  I first assessed whether it was possible to 
constrain moderation of the influences common to moderator and phenotype to zero without 
significant decrease in fit. I then attended to moderation of the influences unique to the 
phenotype. I present the parameter estimates from best-fitting model(s).  In all cases, all 
latent A, C, and E variances and covariances were freely estimated.  




Descriptive statistics for the moderator and phenotypes are provided in Table 4.3. For 
the phenotypes, descriptive statistics are provided for sum scores, transformed sum scores 
and IRT scores. The Well-being sum score showed negative skew which was reduced 
considerably by a normalising transformation, specifically, a squaring of scores. The IRT 
factor scores for this phenotype showed a level of non-normality similar to the transformed 
sum score but slightly more negative. The correlation between Well-being and Intellectual 
interests was around r=.18 and practically unaffected by which phenotypic proxy was used.  
The correlations between the three kinds of scores derived from the Well-being items were all 
>.97. 
 The Aggression sum score showed positive skewness. Given the magnitude of 
positive skewness, a natural log transformation was used and this produced scores with a 
near-normal distribution. The IRT factor scores for this phenotype also substantially reduced 
non-normality but these scores were more positively skewed than the transformed sum 
scores.  The correlation between Aggression and Intellectual interests was around r=-.12 and 
practically identical across the three different kinds of phenotypic proxy.   The correlations 
between the three kinds of scores derived from the Aggression items were also all >.97. 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for Well-being, Aggression and Intellectual Interests 
phenotypes 
Phenotypic proxy Mean (SD) Skew Kurtosis Correlation  
with moderator 
Intellectual Interests sum score 13.32 (3.75) 0.13 -0.27 N/A 
Well-being sum score 11.15 (2.21) -1.06 0.71 .18 
Well-being sum score transformed 0 (1) -0.36 -0.90 .19 
Well-being IRT score 0 (0.89) -0.42 -0.32 .18 
Aggression sum score 3.66 (3.21) 1.12 1.09 -.12 
Aggression sum score transformed 0 (1) 0.23 -0.79 -.12 
Aggression IRT score -0.04 (0.86) 0.46 -0.40 -.13 
 
Well-being 
Model fits for the Well-being scale GxM Models are provided in Table 4.4.  
Parameter estimates for the best fitting model are provided in Table 4.5. 
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-2LL Df BIC AIC saBIC DIC 
Sum score 
aC, cC, eC, αC, γC, 
εC, αU, γU, εU 
10204.50 3727 -7653.07 2750.50 -1734.73 -4228.18 
aC, cC, eC, αU, γU, 
εU 
10204.78 3730 -7663.18 2744.80 -1740.08 -4235.54 
aC, cC, eC, αU 10206.10 3732 -7669.38 2742.09 -1743.11 -4239.91 
aC, cC, eC 10222.75 3733 -7664.47 2756.75 -1736.61 -4234.08 
Transformed sum score 
aC, cC, eC, αC, γC, 
εC, αU, γU, εU 
10214.25 3727 -7648.19 2760.25 -1729.85 -4223.30 
aC, cC, eC, αU, γU, 
εU 
10214.92 3730 -7658.12 2754.92 -1735.02 -4230.48 
aC, cC, eC, αU 10215.09 3732 -7664.88 2751.09 -1738.60 -4235.40 
aC, cC, eC 10219.96 3733 -7665.87 2753.96 -1738.00 -4235.47 
IRT score 
aC, cC, eC, αC, γC, 
εC, αU, γU, εU 
9806.21 3739 -7893.28 2328.21 -1955.88 -4457.37 
aC, cC, eC, αU, γU, 
εU 
9806.89 3742 -7903.21 2322.89 -1961.05 -4464.54 
aC, cC, eC, αU 9807.08 3744 -7909.96 2319.09 -1964.62 -4469.45 
aC, cC, eC 9810.82 3745 -7911.51 2320.82 -1964.59 -4470.08 
 
 For the Well-being scale, the correlations between the three types of score were all 
>.97. The negative skew of the raw sum score was markedly reduced in both the transformed 
sum score and the IRT factor score; however, there was effectively no difference in their 
correlation with the moderator. This illustrates the important point that highly correlated 
scores or scores with effectively identical correlations with the moderator will not necessary 
be equivalent with respect to the distributional properties that GxE tests are sensitive to.  
In the GxE models for this phenotype, it was possible to constrain moderation of the 
common influences to zero without significant decrease in fit irrespective of whether a sum 
score, transformed sum score, or IRT score represented the phenotype. Therefore, this 
became the baseline model for all further model comparisons.  
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Using sum scores, model comparisons supported moderation of the genetic influences 
unique to the phenotype fairly unequivocally.  Constraining this parameter to zero produced 
significant decrease in fit irrespective of whether moderation of the unique C and E 
influences on the phenotype was freely estimated or fixed to zero. Model fit comparisons 
suggested the latter model provided the best overall representation of the data. Thus, results 
suggested that the genetic influences unique to Well-being were smaller at higher levels of 
intellectual interests. 
 Using transformed sum scores, model fit comparisons suggested some moderation of 
unique influences for which moderation of the A influences unique to the phenotype best 
accounted. However, this result was not completely unequivocal: it was possible to constrain 
moderation of the A influences unique to the phenotype  to zero without significant decrease 
in fit when  moderation of the  C and E influences were freely estimated but not when they 
were both fixed to zero.  This further illustrates the lack of resolvability of αU and γU effects 
noted in the simulation study. Here results suggested that the genetic influences unique to 
Well-being may be higher at higher levels of intellectual interests. 
When using IRT scores, results were highly similar to those for the transformed sum 
score in terms of fit differences and parameter magnitudes (αU  was 0.04 when freely 
estimated but the other moderation parameters were fixed to zero). However, the difference 
in fit between the model in which moderation of all the unique A, C and E influences on  the 
phenotype was fixed to zero and the model in which moderation of the unique A influences 
was freely estimated happened to fall just short of statistical significance. Therefore, there 
was technically no statistical evidence for GxE when using the IRT factor score, suggesting 




To summarise results from the Well-being scale, based on a naïve interpretation, all 
favoured different conclusions regarding the presence of GxE: GxE was in evidence using a 
sum score, was somewhat in evidence using a transformed sum score, and was not in 
evidence using an IRT score.  While the results in the latter two conditions were in actuality 
very similar, the fact that the statistical evidence lay on opposite sides of a statistical 
significance threshold  and a naïve interpretation could lead to very different substantive 
conclusions in practice. Only the sum score condition appeared to show unambiguous support 
for GxE. This is consistent with the simulation conditions in which the presence of non-
normality resulted in detection of GxE, irrespective of whether this non-normality was a 
result of moderation or poor scaling.  The moderation observed using the sum score was in 
the direction expected for a negatively skewed sum score even when there was no true 
moderation. Thus, there would be reason to question the validity of the evidence for GxE 
observed in this real data example.  
Table 4.5: Parameter estimates from best-fitting models for Well-being phenotype 
Phenotype GxM Parameter Estimates 
Phenotypic Proxy αC αU γC γU εC εU 
Sum score 0 (fixed) -.11 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 
Transformed sum score 0 (fixed) -.06 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 
IRT factor score 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 
 
Aggression 
GxM model fits for the aggression scale are provided in Table 4.6 and parameter 
estimates from the best fitting model are provided in Table 4.7.  For this phenotype, the 
correlations between the three kinds of scores were also all >.97. The raw sum score showed 
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substantial positive skew but both the transformed sum score and the IRT score had 
reasonably symmetrical distributions. Again, however, the correlations of the phenotype with 
the moderator were practically identical, irrespective of which score type was used and in 
spite of the marked differences in their distributions. 




-2LL df BIC AIC saBIC DIC 
Sum score 
aC, cC, eC, αC, γC, 
εC, αU, γU, εU 
10218.91 3732 -7662.97 2754.91 -1736.69 -4233.49 
aC, cC, eC, αU, γU, 
εU 
10222.38 3735 -7671.51 2752.38 -1740.46 -4239.27 
aC, cC, eC, εU 10224.28 3737 -7677.40 2750.28 -1743.18 -4243.33 
aC, cC, eC 10240.40 3738 -7672.76 2764.40 -1736.96 -4237.77 
Transformed sum score 
aC, cC, eC, αC, γC, 
εC, αU, γU, εU 
10228.85 3732 -7658.00 2764.85 -1731.72 -4228.52 
aC, cC, eC, αU, γU, 
εU 
10232.34 3735 -7666.52 2762.34 -1735.48 -4234.29 
aC, cC, eC, εU 10234.73 3737 -7672.17 2760.73 -1737.96 -4238.10 
aC, cC, eC 10238.00 3738 -7673.96 2762.00 -1738.16 -4238.97 
IRT score 
aC, cC, eC, αC, γC, 
εC, αU, γU, εU 
9676.16 3739 -7958.30 2198.16 -2020.91 -4522.39 
aC, cC, eC, αU, γU, 
εU 
9679.97 3742 -7966.67 2195.97 -2024.51 -4528.00 
aC, cC, eC, εU 9682.21 3744 -7972.39 2194.21 -2027.06 -4531.88 
aC, cC, eC 9687.08 3745 -7973.38 2197.08 -2026.46 -4531.95 
 
 In all conditions, it was possible to constrain moderation of the influences common to 
moderator and phenotype to zero without significant drop in fit. From here, the best-fitting 
model in using a sum score was one in which there was moderation of the unshared 
environmental influences on the phenotype. When this parameter was freely estimated, 
constraining moderation of neither shared environmental influences nor genetic influences on 
the phenotype resulted in statistically significant decrease in fit. Thus, using a sum score, 
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there was evidence that only the unshared environmental influences unique to Aggression 
decreased with increasing intellectual interests. The direction of this moderation was in the 
opposite direction to the direction of the skew of the sum score. Given that the phenotype and 
moderator were negatively correlated, the moderation was in the direction consistent with the 
skew of the sum score. 
 Using transformed sum scores, after constraining moderation of the influences 
common to moderator and phenotype to zero, the best-fitting model involved no moderation 
of the influences unique the phenotype. These could all be individually constrained to zero 
without significant decrease in fit, irrespective of whether moderation parameters for the 
other unique influences were also constrained or freely estimated. Thus, there was no 
evidence that the genetic or environmental influences on Aggression depended on level of 
Intellectual Interests. 
 Using IRT scores, after constraining moderation of the influences common to the 
moderator and phenotype to zero, there was some very weak support for moderation of the 
unshared environmental influences unique to the phenotype. Specifically, fixing moderation 
of unshared environmental influences unique to the phenotype to zero resulted in significant 
decrease in fit when all other moderation parameters were fixed to zero.  Further, the 
decrease in fit on constraining this parameter to zero was not statistically significant when 
moderation of the shared environmental and genetic influences unique to the phenotype was 
freely estimated. In addition, the best-fitting model according to BIC included no moderation, 
albeit by a small margin compared with one in which the moderation of the unshared 
environmental influences unique to the phenotype was freely estimated (∆BIC = 0.99). 
Therefore, on balance the IRT factor score condition showed only very weak evidence for 
moderation intermediate between the results for the sum score (which showed evidence for 
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moderation) and the transformed sum score (which showed no evidence for moderation). 
Again, the direction of moderation suggested smaller unshared environmental influences. 
Table 4.7: Parameter estimates from best-fitting models for Aggression phenotype 
Phenotype GxM Parameter Estimates 
Phenotypic Proxy αC αU γC γU εC εU 
Sum score 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) -0.07 
Transformed sum score 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 
IRT factor score 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) -0.03 
 
Discussion 
It is well known that using poorly scaled sum scores as phenotypic proxies in GxE 
tests can seriously bias tests of GxE. For example, using sets of items where the difficulty or 
location parameters are clustered near the low end of the phenotypic continuum can lead to 
positively skewed sum scores and, in turn, positively biased tests of GxE (e.g. Molenaar & 
Dolan, 2014; Schwabe & van den Berg, 2014). In a simulation study, I assessed the extent to 
which this bias was mitigated by transforming non-normal sum scores to normality. I 
compared this to estimating phenotypic scores from an IRT model: a method that explicitly 
takes account of the scaling properties of items.  The results suggested that using IRT 
methods to provide formal models for the phenotype is worth the effort in providing more 
accurate detection and quantification of GxE effects.  
Based on these analyses, I can extend the arguments set out in the introduction in the 
following ways. First, I confirmed that biases in estimates of GxE can be introduced by poor 
phenotypic scaling that result in sum scores that do not accurately reflect the underlying 
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distributions of the phenotypes they are supposed to represent. The nature of this bias is 
predictable: sum scores that are negatively skewed relative to their underlying phenotypic 
distribution will tend to produce negatively biased moderation parameters and sum scores 
that are positively skewed relative to their underlying phenotypic distribution will tend to 
produce positively biased moderation parameters. When there is no true moderation effect, 
this will often lead to unacceptably high false positive rates.  
These effects occur because non-normality due to poor scaling is not statistically 
distinguishable from non-normality due to presence of interaction. Where there is non-
normality, the model will attribute this to interaction; however, only when the observed 
phenotypic distribution reflects its population distribution will this estimate provide accurate 
quantification of GxE.  Measuring the phenotype and capturing its population distribution as 
accurately as possible is, therefore, important in ensuring accurate assessment of GxE. When 
the raw score from an inventory fails to do this, there may be options for recovering this 
distribution via post-hoc manipulations of its measurement scale.  
 Results showed, in particular, that transforming a score or using an IRT score in place 
of a non-normal sum score can be used to reduce bias. I studied the case in which the latent 
genetic and environmental influences on the phenotype, absent the influence of the moderator 
could be assumed normally distributed in the population. This is a reasonable assumption in 
cases where there are large numbers of small, independent effects on the phenotype. Here, a 
normal distribution of the joint effects of numerous relatively fungible etiological 
contributors is predicted based on the central limit theorem. Under these conditions, using 
either a simple transformation or IRT scores reduced bias in GxE because they led to score 
distributions that better approximated the population distribution of the phenotype.   
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In a case where there is no true moderation effect, using a phenotypic proxy that 
better reflects its population distribution than a sum score reduces false positive rates 
substantially. When the direction of the moderation is consistent with the direction of skew, 
either transforming to normality or using an IRT score will give close to unbiased parameter 
estimates and result in good power to detect the effect.  However, in cases where moderation 
and skew are in opposite directions, these methods will underestimate the effects and reduce 
power to detect GxE relative to situations in which the phenotypes are not subject to scaling 
problems.   
 I also provided a real data example from the Minnesota Twin Registry using two 
phenotypes with non-normal sum scores. Analysing the Well-Being phenotype using 
(negatively skewed) sum scores yielded statistically and practically significant GxE whereas 
using IRT scores suggested no significant GxE. The transformed sum scores yielded evidence 
intermediate between these two outcomes. The direction of the GxE using sum scores was 
consistent with the direction of the skewness of the sum score.  This suggests that the 
observed effect could be due to item scaling.  Moreover, based on these results, researchers 
using sum scores rather than IRT scores could easily have been led to opposite substantive 
conclusions despite the very high correlations between the raw and IRT scores. 
The Aggression phenotype did not yield evidence of GxE irrespective of whether 
(positively skewed) sum scores, transformed sum scores, or IRT scores were used. This 
showed that non-normal trait distributions will not automatically result in the appearance of 
GxE and that altering phenotypic distributions will not necessarily affect the GxE parameter. 
However, there was evidence for dependence of another moderation parameter on scaling: 
using a sum score and an IRT score, there was evidence for negative moderation of the 
unshared environmental influences unique to the phenotype (captured by the εU parameter) 
but there was no such evidence using a transformed sum score. Taking into account the fact 
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that the phenotype and moderator were negatively correlated, the εU parameter was 
proportional to and in the direction consistent with the skew of the phenotypic proxy. That is, 
the parameter was most negative when the phenotypic proxy was strongly skewed (sum 
score), less negative when the phenotypic proxy was moderately positively skewed (IRT 
score) and effectively zero when the phenotypic proxy was only slightly positively skewed 
(transformed sum score). Thus, although I focussed on the αU parameter because it is most 
often used to operationalise theoretical hypotheses, this example highlights the fact that the 
effects of scaling on GxE models are not confined to that one parameter.  
These results reinforce the message that poorly scaled sum scores should be avoided 
in tests of GxE. However, they also imply that the commonly used strategy of transforming 
non-normal sum scores to normality will in many cases fail to address the biasing effects of 
poor scaling on GxE tests fully, particularly when the true moderation parameter is in the 
opposite direction to both scale skew and moderation of the unshared and shared 
environmental influences on the phenotype. IRT scores were also subject to this limitation 
but overall performed better than transforming the sum score to normality in terms of 
parameter bias, false positive rates and true positive rates.  
Practically speaking, sum scores are not desirable as phenotypic proxies because, in 
addition to producing high false positive rates, they can yield results that suggest moderation 
in the opposite direction to the true moderation effect. The strategies of transforming the sum 
score to normality or using an IRT score do not suffer these limitations; however, both result 
in tests that lack statistical power when the moderation is in the opposite direction to skew.  
Given this, transformed sum scores and IRT scores provide conservative tests of GxE when it 
is present. However, they also fail to control the type 1 error rate completely when GxE is not 




Demonstrating that sum scores are highly correlated with transformed sum scores or 
IRT scores for the same phenotype is thus not sufficient justification for using them in place 
of these better-performing methods. Because correlation coefficients are relatively unaffected 
by rank-preserving transformations, sum and functionally-transformed scores will show very 
high correlations, even when their distributions are markedly different. . This was illustrated 
in the real data examples where, in spite of leading to diverging conclusions about the 
presence and strength of moderation effects, the three types of score were correlated with one 
another at >.97. 
 Although using IRT scores is more time consuming and technically demanding than 
using normalising transformation, it may be worth the additional effort. In addition to 
performing better in the current study, IRT scores can be estimated reasonably easily in a 
range of freely available software packages and have several practical and theoretical 
advantages over transformed sum scores. First, they are easily estimable in the presence of 
missing item data, or when respondents did not complete an identical set of items (Embretson 
& Reise, 2000). Second, the diversity of available IRT models means that many kinds of 
response formats, scale structures, or theories about how the latent trait relates to item 
responses can be accommodated. For example, a bi-factor model could be fit when it is 
desirable to partition general and specific trait variance captured by a set of items (Cai, Yang, 
& Henson, 2011); if a scale has a categorical response format, a nominal response model 
could be fit (Bock, 1972); or if items follow an ideal point process an unfolding model can be 
fit (e.g. Chernyshenko, Stark, Drasgow, & Roberts, 2007). All of these  and other features can 
be, easily dealt with in an IRT framework, while posing significant problems or being simply 
impossible to take account of when using sum scores, both raw and transformed to normality. 
Furthermore, while an IRT model can be chosen based on theoretical considerations, 
the choice of a transformation is somewhat arbitrary and usually driven by pragmatic 
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considerations. The choice of an IRT model can be evaluated both overall and with respect to 
individual items using well-studied goodness-of-fit statistics and graphical checks. A 
beneficial side effect of this is that the process of fitting and evaluating IRT model(s) is likely 
to encourage explicit consideration of the assumptions that underpin the phenotypic proxy 
used. However, no analogous tests exist for transformations.   More importantly, from a 
conceptual perspective, if the genetic and environmental influences on the phenotype in the 
absence of the influence of the moderator are normally distributed and there is true GxE in 
the population then the phenotype should show a non-normal distribution because GxE 
involves an expansion (or contraction) of the variance in a phenotype according to the levels 
of moderator. This expansion (or contraction) of variance shows up in the marginal 
distribution of the phenotype as non-normality that is commensurate with the GxE effect.  
Using a transformation to normality is, therefore, directly at odds with theoretical 
expectations when GxE is hypothesised. For this reason, methodologies such as Box-Cox 
transformations which can optimise the normalisation of a distribution may actually perform 
worse than cruder methods such as log-transformations. The latter will almost always yield a 
worse approximation to normality but this worse approximation may retain some of the non-
normality due to the interaction when one is present. In IRT models, the need to retain any 
non-normality that is genuinely due to a GxE is also a problem to some extent; however, the 
assumption of a normal latent distribution is not a necessity; where appropriate alternative 
prior distributions can be specified in a manner that is far more flexible than attempting to 
obtain that distribution through transformation of observed scores. Where both approaches 
are limited is that the underlying liability distribution absent the influence of the moderator 
could be non-normal due to other moderators or the effects of rare but highly influential 
etiological factors that engender extreme effects. Analogous to the problem of distinguishing 
non-normality due to moderation versus poor scaling, it is not easy to disentangle non-
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normality due to the effect of a moderator of interest and non-normality due to other 
etiological factors without detailed a priori knowledge. 
Further, the favourable performance of the IRT scores in the simulation study should 
be interpreted in light of the fact that they were estimated under idealised conditions. In 
practice their use is more complicated and may be less effective. For example, a graded 
response model was fit to the data because it was known that this model had been used to 
generate the item responses. Thus, there was no risk of mis-specifying the psychometric 
model.   In reality, the appropriate model for the items will not be known in advance; it will 
have to be chosen on the basis of the item format and a hypothesis about how the latent trait 
is related to item responding and then tested for appropriateness. The lack of a priori 
knowledge about the appropriate IRT model for a given set of items increases the risk that the 
chosen model will be mis-specified in some important way. Further, parametric IRT models 
are also often poor fits to the very same kinds of data that prove problematic in GxE tests, 
such as those concerning psychopathological phenotypes. Less restrictive non-parametric IRT 
models are sometimes recommended as alternatives (Meijer & Baneke, 2004) but these 
methods do not allow estimation of factor scores for use in GxE tests. Finally, at a very 
pragmatic level, IRT models are only useful when item-level data are available, which is not 
always the case. 
Another practical consideration when using IRT scores in tests of GxE, is the 
importance of assessing the empirical reliability of factor scores from IRT models, as one 
would for sum scores (see Culpepper, 2013).  Unreliable IRT scores will not only be 
ineffective in addressing bias in GxE; they will also result in attenuated estimates of twin 
correlations and bias other model parameters (van den Berg et al., 2007).  Similarly, as the 
extent to which the accuracy of the scores as measures of the intended underlying dimension 
depends on the appropriateness of the IRT model, its specification should be carefully 
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considered and its fit assessed empirically (see Embretson & Reise, 2013), bearing in mind 
that even the best fitting models will represent only an approximation to reality. 
 In practice, it is also worthwhile to compare results obtained using IRT scores with 
those obtained using raw and transformed sum scores. Comparison can highlight how 
sensitive results are to phenotypic scaling. Under some conditions, e.g. when the phenotype 
and moderator do not have strong associations or the phenotypic distribution departs only 
slightly from its population distribution, scaling of the phenotype may make little difference 
to results. In addition, in rare cases where the phenotypic distribution is mis-specified in the 
IRT model used to estimate the scores but well approximated by the sum scores, the sum 
scores could, in principle, produce less biased results than the IRT scores. Even when the 
phenotypic distribution is correctly assumed to be normal, no non-linear transformation or 
IRT score estimation method guarantees a perfect reconstruction of the phenotypic 
distribution as it exists in the population. In fact, as argued above, the scores produced by a 
transformation to normality could be ‘too normal’ in the sense that in the presence of GxE 
non-normality of the phenotype would usually be expected.  
In sum, there are significant challenges in correctly choosing between a ‘GxE’ and a 
‘scaling’ explanation for apparent GxE effects but the importance of doing so is considerable. 
For example, if a GxE explanation is incorrectly accepted over a scaling explanation, this 
falsely supports the view that some features of a person or their environment either constrains 
or supports the expression of genetic influences on some phenotype of interest. At an 
academic level, this can lead to theories which lack parsimony and which when further 
pursued may lead to wasted research efforts. Further, spurious GxE evidence can also falsely 
bolster the impression that a candidate moderating variable is an as important causal factor or 
potentially fruitful target of intervention. Thus, continued efforts should be invested into 




A limitation of the current study is that I did not directly compare the two-step IRT 
approach with a one-step approach presented here. A one-step approach has yet to be 
developed for testing of GxE within the Purcell’s (2002) framework; however, it is possible 
to anticipate some of its disadvantages and advantages. First, the approach would share the 
limitation of the two-step approach that the true phenotypic distribution would not be known 
but assumed. Assuming a normal distribution for the phenotype when the true distribution is 
non-normal could, in principle, result in biased GxE tests in a similar way to using a poorly 
scaled sum score. It would also share the necessity to select an appropriate IRT model and 
freely estimate its parameters in a finite sample. A further disadvantage would be its 
statistical and computational complexity as compared to a two-step approach. However, an 
important advantage would be that the error-free latent trait could be decomposed directly 
and this is likely to result in less biased GxE tests. 
Further, and perhaps most importantly, a one-step approach is more appropriate from 
a conceptual perspective because it provides a much more direct operationalization of GxE 
hypotheses.  In the two-step approach, a distribution for the phenotype is assumed in the first 
step; however, in tests of GxE it is important to distinguish between assumptions about the 
marginal distribution of the phenotype and the distribution of the underlying genetic and 
environmental influences absent the influence of the moderator. While the former would be 
expected to be non-normal because being subject to moderation skews the phenotypic 
distribution, the latter can usually be assumed normal. The two-step approach unfortunately 
conflates these distinct contributions because it specifies a distribution only for the latent 
phenotype. In addition, although I designed the simulation conditions to be as realistic as 
possible, I covered only a limited range of the possible conditions that could occur in the real 
world. Although the principles discussed are likely general, I conducted analyses within 
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specific GxE and IRT frameworks and used a limited range of parameter values. Similarly, 
while inclusion of a real data example is important to test conclusions from simulation studies 
in a more ecologically valid context, these too are limited by their specificity.  
Conclusions 
 Tests of GxE can be biased by inappropriate scaling of a phenotype, and reliance on 
raw scores that are significantly skewed is to be discouraged. Two potentially useful solutions 
are to transform sum scores to normality or to estimate IRT scores based on an appropriate 
model. Although these strategies will suffer low statistical power, they reduce the rate of 
spurious GxE detection and recover the correct direction of effects. Therefore, researchers 
can be more confident about the presence and direction of GxE when it is identified using one 
of these strategies than when using a raw sum score. 
Footnotes1 
Purcell’s GxM approach requires assumption of a normal distribution for the phenotype 
conditional on the moderator; however, the presence of moderation will result in a skewed 





Chapter 5: Discussion 
In this thesis, I have defined construct truncation as under-representation of the 
extremes of a variable in a research sample. In the preceding chapters I outlined ways in 
which construct truncation commonly arises and showed that its occurrence may be 
associated with serious distortions of the theoretical conclusions drawn from affected 
datasets. In this final chapter, I summarise and integrate the results of these chapters, 
highlight their limitations, and suggest future directions for research. 
In Chapter 2, I focussed on construct truncation due to person selection, highlighting 
one area for which I believe the issue to be especially pertinent. I argued that studies 
involving psychopathological phenotypes are particularly vulnerable to the effects of range-
restricting person selection due to frequent focus on clinically ascertained samples. Using an 
example from autism spectrum disorder (ASD) research, I presented a statistical model of 
range-restriction due to clinical diagnosis, assuming an underlying multivariate normal 
distribution of autistic traits in the population.  Using this model, I evaluated the extent to 
which estimates of associations between symptom domains in ASD are under-estimated in 
clinically ascertained samples. Results suggested that the downward bias in estimates could 
be substantial, especially when considering associations involving the restricted repetitive 
activities symptom of the classical triad of ASD. A real data example also demonstrated that 
associations between ASD traits were much smaller when analyses were restricted to 
clinically diagnosed individuals.  
 In Chapter 3, I considered a more subtle example of construct truncation due to 
person selection, highlighting the ease with which it can arise undetected. I considered, in 
detail, a specific example of possible construct truncation from individual differences 
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research: the ‘intelligence compensation hypothesis’ (ICH). The ICH is that cognitive ability 
and conscientiousness are negatively correlated due to a tendency for individuals to calibrate 
their effort levels to ability levels. I hypothesised that previous evidence for the ICH is 
artifactual and has resulted from construct truncation on achievement in many samples. I 
argued that the negative associations between cognitive ability and conscientiousness cited in 
support of ICH have been due to the fact that the samples in which these associations were 
observed tended to include only individuals who showed certain levels of occupational or 
educational accomplishment. Taking a sample with relatively little such non-random 
selection I found that the associations between cognitive ability and conscientiousness were 
positive. However, artificially introducing selection on achievement resulted in attenuation of 
these positive estimates and in half the cases reversals in their direction. Together, this 
evidence suggests not only that intelligence and conscientiousness are probably not generally 
negatively correlated in the full population, but often become so when samples are selected 
based on specified levels of achievement. Estimates of their association may also be 
substantively negatively biased when selection on achievement is indirect. For example, 
despite researcher’s intentions, it is common that their samples are more educated and thus 
likely also of higher average IQ and conscientiousness than the general population.  
Finally, in Chapter 4, I considered the problem construct truncation due to item 
selection. I developed a model of construct-truncating item selection to study its effects on 
gene-environment interactions, as well as compare possible solutions. These simulations 
suggested that using raw sum scores as measures of the phenotype of interest can produce 
substantial bias in estimates of gene-environment interaction; however, this bias can be 
substantially mitigated by transforming the raw sum scores to normality or by using IRT 
scores. Two real data examples showed that the choice of score: raw sum, transformed sum, 
or IRT score, can lead to quite different conclusions. In one example, using a raw sum score 
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suggested statistically significant GxE while an IRT score suggested no GxE. Together, these 
results suggested that construct-truncating item selection has the potential to and may already 
have misled researchers interested in evaluating GxE interactions. Fortunately, two simple-to-
use fixes showed promise in mitigating these effects, namely transformation of raw scores 
and use of IRT scores.  
 A common message across all chapters is that there are commonly occurring 
circumstances under which construct truncation can have important implications for the 
accuracy of substantive inferences made based on affected datasets. Our increasingly 
sophisticated theories about interplay among variables and characterisation of constructs 
whose tests require use of increasingly complex statistical methodologies are especially 
susceptible; for example, construct truncation can even reverse the direction of apparent GxE 
interaction effect whilst barely affecting the association between phenotype and moderator. 
Compounding the problem, the presence of construct truncation may not be obvious as in the 
example of the ICH in which the truncation occurred primarily on a variable that was not 
explicitly measured. In the following section I, therefore, make some recommendations for 
detecting, quantifying and mitigating the effects of construct truncation. 
It would be easy to recommend that research studies avoid problems of construct 
truncation by utilising samples and measures that reliably capture the full range of variability 
in their constructs of interest. Unfortunately, this is extremely difficult to implement in 
practice.  As noted in the introduction, construct truncation due to person selection is often 
beyond complete control of the researcher because active participation in the vast majority of 
studies is voluntary, and individuals often vary systematically in interest and motivation to 
participate  (e.g. Marcus & Schütz, 2005). The same is generally true when participation is 
passive, as, for example, when banks of anonymised data gathered for other purposes, such as 
American Scholastic Assessment Test scores, are used (e.g. Hunt & Madyastha, 2008; Lee & 
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Valliant, 2009). Likewise, construct truncation due to item selection may be difficult to avoid 
because of the need to rely on validated questionnaires which are unlikely to have been 
developed with explicit focus on their ranges of reliable measurement (Thomas, 2011). Thus, 
my recommendations aim to acknowledge these difficulties and suggest practical steps that 
can be taken to minimise problems of construct truncation.  
Recommendations concerning construct truncation due to person selection 
Minimising construct truncation begins with recruitment of participants. The goal is to 
recruit participants who are representative of a specified target population. Certain 
recruitment strategies have been associated with better sample representativeness. These 
include providing specific training for the project workers responsible for recruitment; 
investigating  and addressing reasons for non-participation; providing appropriate  incentives 
or reassurances to overcome barriers to non-participation; sending multiple reminders; and 
attempting to contact target participants via multiple means including phone, personalised 
letters, and door-knocking (where appropriate); and enriched recruitment in vulnerable 
subgroups. These strategies have been shown to increase participation rates especially 
amongst individuals ‘at risk’ of non-participation and whose presence in the sample is crucial 
to its representativeness (Eisner & Ribeaud, 2007).  However, they are also resource- and 
time- intensive, and for many studies will be unrealistic with limited resources. 
Given the practical difficulties of recruiting a representative sample, it is always 
advisable to consider the possibility that a sample has been subject to construct truncation, 
even when there has been no explicit exclusion of individuals with more extreme trait levels. 
The sampling strategy should be evaluated conceptually and an attempt made to understand 
the extent to which it was likely to have disproportionately missed individuals at high or low 
levels of the relevant constructs. For example, one of the most commonly used convenience 
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samples is that of university or college students. As noted by several authors, researcher using 
such a sample should consider the fact that they tend to exclude individuals of lower 
cognitive ability due to the standards of academic achievement that have to be reached to 
enter the population of university or college students (e.g. Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 
2004; Hägglund & Larsson, 2006).  More generally, for any construct with negative social 
connotations, it is typically the individuals who are highest on that construct that are the most 
difficult to recruit and retain. It is the individuals with the most problematic behaviour that 
are least likely to participate in studies of crime (Eisner & Ribeaud, 2007), individuals with 
the highest level of psychopathology who are least likely to respond in psychiatric 
epidemiology studies (e.g. Kessler et al,. 2005; Merikangas et al., 2010), and individuals with 
the lowest levels of cognitive ability and greatest decline in it who are least likely to 
participate in studies of cognitive decline (Deary et al., 2011). There are also some variables 
that are commonly measured and associated with participation in research studies irrespective 
of the nature of the study.  These may serve as red flags for construct truncation when seen to 
diverge from their expected distributions. Demographic variables associated with being less 
likely to participate in research include low levels of education, male sex, being a member of 
an ethnic minority, poor physical and/or mental health, and low socioeconomic status 
(Bechger et al., 2002; van Goor et al., 2005; Volken, 2013).  
Post-data collection, to evaluate the presence and gauge the degree of construct 
truncation due to person selection, sample means and variances can sometimes be compared 
with normative means and variances (e.g. Costa, McCrae, Zonderman, Barbano, Lebowitz & 
Larson, 1986). Here, substantial departures of sample from normative summary statistics 
would indicate cause for concern. Availability of normative data is, however, the exception 
rather than the rule and even where available is likely to have itself been subject to some 
construct truncation due to person selection in the norming sample because of reliance on 
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volunteers (Marcus & Schütz, 2005; Vink et al., 2004). Comparison of sample to normative 
data can also sometimes be misleading because attending to reductions in the variances of 
observed variables without considering the selection mechanism underlying those reductions 
could lead to false conclusions about selection effects. One example would be to conclude 
that selection effects are minimal when phenotypic variance in a measure is the same as in a 
normative sample when in fact a decrease in the systematic variance in that measure was 
offset by an increase in error variance. This could occur, for example, if a test is administered 
to a sample for whom the reading level of the test exceeds the reading ability of many 
respondents. Similarly, comparison of sample to normative data requires the assumption that 
no construct truncation due to item selection has occurred. If it has, the normative data will 
not reliably capture the range of the construct as it occurs in the target population.  
In the absence of normative data, efforts to obtain some basic information from 
individuals who did not participate can also provide valuable information about whether 
construct truncation is likely to have been a problem and may even allow corrections for 
construct truncation to be made (Vink et al., 2004). Where this is not possible, examining the 
factors associated with responding later or with dropping out may be informative about the 
factors associated with complete non-participation. It is not, however, necessarily valid to 
consider late responders/dropouts and non-responders as though they were simply at different 
points on the same continuum of participation because of qualitative differences in reasons 
for non-response (Studer et al., 2013). Those who participate late, for example, may simply 
need additional facilitation, reminders or incentives to participate whereas complete non-
responders may object to the study or to the notion of handing information about themselves 
over. The availability and fidelity of information about the composition of the population as a 
whole or of the non-participating subsection is critical here. It is not, for example, sufficient 
to examine response rates because there is no guarantee of a straightforward relation between 
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bias due to non-response and extent of non-response (Stang, 2003). Non-response may be 
high but unrelated to the construct of interest. On the other hand it may be low except for 
specific sociocultural groups with more extreme average levels of the construct of interest 
(Eisner & Ribeaud, 2007).  
It may be possible to apply statistical corrections to the data or parameter estimates 
with the aim of obtaining an unbiased estimate of a parameter affected by construct 
truncation. For example, depending on the information available in a given study and the 
assumptions that can reasonably be made about the distribution of that construct in the target 
population, possible strategies include selection models, data weighting, range-restriction 
corrections, or censored (e.g. tobit) regression (e.g. Asparouhov, 2005;  Kamakura & Wedel, 
2001; Nie, Chu, & Korostyshevskiy, 2008; Sackett & Yang, 2000). These strategies have 
some important limitations which boil down to the fact that unless information about the 
selection mechanism and/or the target population is known (or can be reasonably inferred), 
these corrections will not yield unbiased estimates. For example, in range restriction 
corrections for Pearson correlations, there are many ways in which bias can result including: 
selecting the wrong formula for a given selection scenario, violation of the assumptions of 
linearity and homoscedasticity of the regression of the selection variable(s) on the construct 
of interest, assigning the wrong roles to variables; or submitting incorrect estimates of the 
degree of range restriction or population variances of variables (Alexander et al., 1984; Linn, 
1983; Schmidt, Oh, & Le, 2006; Sackett et al., 2007).  Thus, the best approach overall may be 
to estimate upper and lower bounds of the effect using corrected and uncorrected estimates 
together with a range of plausible assumptions about the selection mechanism and/or 
distribution of the construct in the population.  
Recommendations concerning construct truncation due to item selection 
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Minimising construct truncation due to item selection begins at the test development 
stage. Traditionally, test developers have sought to create tests with maximal internal 
consistency; however, in doing so they may have inadvertently restricted thereliable range of 
measurement. This is because in aiming to maximise internal consistency, items are generally 
selected to form a highly correlated set. Highly correlated items will tend to have very similar 
response distributions, implying that they tap similar levels of a construct. Furthermore, 
selecting items to maximise their internal consistency provides no guarantee of high test-
retest reliability and may in fact undermine the validity of a scale if it results in the omission 
of item covering important content areas (e.g. McCrae, Kurtz, Yamagata & Terracciano, 
2011). To both avoid restriction of content breadth and to ensure the measurement of an 
appropriate range of construct levels with good precision, items should aim to capture a wide 
range of construct levels, even if this sacrifices internal consistency to some degree. For 
example, developers of measures of aggression should consider including not only 
behaviours indicative of high levels of overt aggression (e.g. hitting, kicking, physical 
conflicts etc.), but also low to middling levels  (e.g. shyness, assertativeness, suppressed 
anger, angry ideations; Anholt & Mackay, 2012).  
One area where a restricted range of reliable measurement is of particular importance 
is in measuring psychopathological constructs. Here, additional factors play into the selection 
of items which tap limited ranges of trait levels. First, many items in many 
psychopathological scales have been selected based on their ability to discriminate between 
diagnosed cases and non-cases. These items will tend to be very good at measuring trait 
levels at and near a clinical diagnostic cut-off point but likely at the expense of reliably 
measuring other trait levels. Second, items tapping trait levels at and above a diagnostic cut-
off point tend to be selected because they have the greatest face validity. Conceptualising 
sub-clinical psychopathological trait levels is relatively new, and researchers may have less 
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previous research to inform the writing of items tapping these levels. This makes it difficult 
to test the very idea that psychopathologies are the extremes of common trait levels 
empirically too. 
 Perhaps the most promising approach to addressing construct truncation due to item 
selection is fitting parametric item response theory models to estimate item and test 
information across the range of trait values during test development. Parametric IRT models, 
unlike the majority of other test development and evaluation methods, acknowledge that the 
precision of measurement is not equal across the entire range of construct values. Computing 
the test information function allows evaluation of the locations along the presumed latent trait 
continuum that are relatively more and less precisely measured. Construct truncation is in 
evidence when a test cannot measure a trait at one or both extremes with adequate 
measurement precision. Estimating item difficulties can identify the regions of the continuum 
that specific items are capable of most reliably measuring. On identifying regions of low 
information that lack in items at all, or where items have poor discrimination, items may be 
written or modified to extend the range of reliable measurement of the test above and/or 
below its existing range. However, it is important to acknowledge there will be limits to the 
number of items that can be administered in a given study, such that including many items to 
achieve a favourable reliable range of measurement may come at the expense of other test 
properties. For example, there may be a need to weigh reliable range of measurement against 
the conceptual breadth of the construct that can be measured: an instantiation of the 
‘bandwidth-fidelity dilemma’ (e.g. Ones & Viswesvaran, 1996). However, researchers should 
also consider the various available methods of mitigating this trade-off such as computerised 
adaptive testing (e.g. Pilkonis, Choi, Reise, Stover, Riley & Cella, 2011) or planned 
missingness designs (e.g. Rhemtulla & Little, 2012). The former minimises the number of 
items administered by way of an algorithm that selects items that are expected to be most 
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informative about a respondent’s trait level. The latter can be used to reduce the number of 
items administered through strategic omission of some items and later correction for 
missingness. 
In Chapter 4, I also showed that, provided the IRT model is correctly specified, factor 
scores estimated from it will provide a good estimate of a true GxE effect in most cases. This 
is consistent with other previous research showing bias reductions in other moderation 
models (e.g. Kang & Waller, 2005; Morse et al., 2012). It may even be possible to use this 
technique to undo some of the effects of construct truncation due to person selection although 
this remains to be determined.  
Future Directions 
Across the previous chapters, I noted that there are statistical methods available for 
correcting data or parameters for construct truncation provided some information is known or 
can be reasonably assumed. Their limitation is, in particular, in the availability of information 
about the distribution (especially variance or shape) of a construct in the population. Thus, 
increasing our knowledge of these underlying distributions is an important area for future 
research. As one example, use of IRT models in the case of psychopathological phenotypes 
requires an assumption to be made about their underlying distribution in the population. I 
took the approach of assuming that a normal distribution characterised the distributions of 
these populations. This is consistent with much of current opinion in psychopathology 
research which assumes that psychopathological traits are merely the upper extremes of 
normal distributions, not qualitatively distinct states (Caspi et al., 2014). The rationale for this 
is based on various pieces of evidence: the highly polygenic nature of psychopathological 
traits, observed normal distributions of psychopathological traits in the general population, 
presence of sub-clinical levels of psychopathological traits in relatives of individuals with a 
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clinical diagnosis, and movement of individuals into and out of the clinical range of 
psychopathological traits over the course of their life (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Cichetti 
& Rogosch, 2002; Wray et al., 2014).  
Indicative of their degree of acceptance within the research community, models of 
psychopathological traits that assume underlying continua are providing a basis for the 
development of a research classification system for psychopathological disorders (Cuthbert & 
Insel, 2013).  These kinds of models are also already being built on, adapted and extended to 
answer questions about psychopathological etiology such as group differences in prevalence.  
For example, for phenotypes such as ASD, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) 
and aggression in which males are disproportionately affected, multi-factorial threshold 
theory states that a continuous (usually assumed normal) etiological liability distribution 
underpins psychopathological phenotypes; however, males have a lower threshold for 
manifesting clinical levels of the trait (Hamshere et al., 2013; Lai et al., 2015; Tuvblad et al., 
2006). That is, females with same ‘etiological load’ as males would be less likely to qualify 
for clinical diagnosis because they are in some way more protected against exhibiting the 
maladaptive behaviours on which clinical diagnosis is based.  
Certainly, some conditions show a liability distribution that would be expected to be 
non-normal: Alzheimer’s disease is, for example, known to be influenced by at least one 
allele of disproportionately large effect: the APOE e4 allele (Genin et al., 2011).  Even in 
phenotypes in which a highly polygenic model is generally accepted, arguments can also be 
made for underlying non-normal liability distributions due to processes such as GxE, and 
intra- and inter-allelic interaction or the effects of powerful causal (genetic or environmental) 
factors (e.g. see van den Oord et al., 2003).  As discussed in chapter 4, the presence of GxEs 
will tend to expand the variance in a trait at one end of its distribution, equivalent to 
introducing skewness. Recent replication crises notwithstanding, the very large number of 
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published GxE studies published to date would suggest at least a perception in the field that 
GxEs must be common (Dick et al., 2015).  
 Some authors have argued that there may not be meaningful variation in 
psychopathological traits below clinical cut-off points at all; that these traits are better 
characterised as ‘quasi-traits’ (Reise & Waller, 2009). Overall, however, it would seem most 
plausible to consider the distributions of most psychopathological traits to be mixture 
distributions. In intellectual disability, for example, many idiopathic cases may simply 
represent the lower extreme of a continuous distribution; however, many others (e.g. Down 
syndrome) clearly represent the effects of a single, powerful genetic or environmental insult.  
Some studies have aimed to identify the appropriate distributions to characterise 
psychopathological traits by comparing the fit of various models assuming different 
distributions (e.g. van den Oord et al., 2003). However, the question of the appropriate 
distribution to assume for a given phenotype is unlikely to be answered solely by examining 
the fit of various distributions to the underlying latent distributions of these traits for reasons 
discussed in Chapter 4 relating to the fact that a multitude of statistically indistinguishable 
states could underlie the same observed data. Rather, continuing to make progress in 
understanding the etiology of complex traits is likely to be critical because this can directly 
inform on the reasonableness of distributional assumptions. Although it was once necessary 
(at least in practical terms) to assume multivariate normality for parameter estimation, recent 
and continuing developments in statistical methodology, especially availability of Bayesian 
estimation techniques which make complex models more tractable, mean that this is no 
longer always the case. Thus, the primary limiting factor is likely theoretical knowledge to 





The primary limitations of this thesis concern the extent to which the simulation 
studies captured the range of circumstances likely to be occurring in the real world. While I 
intended the simulation designs across the chapters to cover a range of plausible real world 
conditions, there are inevitable limits to the range of variables that can be manipulated in any 
given study. In addition, I considered construct truncation due to person and item separately, 
whereas in the real world they are likely to co-occur and interact. In fact, this is one way in 
which construct truncation may go undetected: if a measure with a limited range of reliable 
measurement is administered to a sample with a correspondingly limited range of trait values 
then there will be few clues in the data that construct truncation has occurred. I also did not 
discuss the important issue of how to determine what the target population should be. 
Whether or not construct truncation is relevant depends on whether the aim is to generalise to 
a target population that exhibits only a limited range of possible construct levels. However, it 
is not always easy to determine whether it is appropriate to consider this kind of restricted 
population rather than a more general population as, for example, when it is not clear if 
clinical levels of a trait really do have the same meaning and origin as sub-clinical trait levels. 
Further, even if considered appropriate, analysing a restricted population is likely to entail 
issues such as violations of normality due to dichotomising of a continuous distribution. 
Finally, I did not address in any detail the practical challenges of developing 
questionnaires that have the same meaning and measurement properties at high and low 
levels of a construct (e.g. above and below clinical cut-off points; Murray et al., 2014). This 
is particularly a problem for constructs in which questionnaire responding may be directly 
related to the trait of interest. For example, individuals who are high in neuroticism are more 
likely to use middle response options, thus resulting in systematic underestimation of their 




Construct truncation can have important implications for the theoretical inferences 
made in empirical research. Statistical solutions can help to mitigate its effects; however, they 
are limited by the need to make assumptions about the distribution of the construct in the 
population and/or the selection mechanism that intervened between population and sample. In 
contributing to resolving this limitation, improved understandings of the population 
distributions and underlying etiologies of specific phenotypes are likely to be critical in 
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  N=1000  ##sample size 
  am=0.3^0.5   #for moderator 
  cm=0.2^0.5 
  em=0.5^0.5 
  ac=0.3^0.5   #common to moderator and phenotype 
  cc=0.1^0.5 
  ec=0.1^0.5 
  au=0.2^0.5   #unique to phenotype 
  cu=0.1^0.5    
  eu=0.2^0.5 
  alpha_c=0   #moderation of common A 
  gamma_c=0   #moderation of common C 
  epsilon_c=0  #moderation of common E 
  alpha_u=-0.15 #moderation of unique A 
  gamma_u=0.20    #moderation of unique C 
  epsilon_u=0.08  #moderation of unique E 
   
   
  ####In this section variance-covariance matrix the LVs in the GxM is  
  ####defined for the MZ twins. A,C and E refer to source of variance 
  ####c and u refer to common and unique 
  ### 1 and 2 refer to twin 1 and twin 2 
   
   
  MZ=matrix(c( 
    1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,          #Ac1 
    0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,          #Cc1 
    0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,          #Ec1 
    0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,          #Au1 
    0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,          #Cu1 
    0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,          #Eu1 
    1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,          #Ac2 
    0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,          #Cc2 
    0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,          #Ec2 
    0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,          #Au2 
    0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,          #Cu2 
    0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1),12,12,byrow=T) #Eu2 
   
  MZ=MZ+t(MZ)-diag(diag(MZ)) 







   
  ##generate latent variable scores by sampling from MVN distribution 
  MZ_ACE=mvrnorm(N,c(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0),MZ,empirical=T) 
  dimnames(MZ_ACE)[[2]]<-
c("Ac1","Cc1","Ec1","Au1","Cu1","Eu1","Ac2","Cc2","Ec2","Au2","Cu2","Eu2") 
   
  ##model for moderator 
  ##this is from eq. 1 in the manuscript 
  MZ_ACE<-as.data.frame(MZ_ACE) 
  attach(MZ_ACE) 
  M1_MZ<-Ac1*am + Cc1*cm + Ec1*em 
  M2_MZ<-Ac2*am + Cc2*cm + Ec2*em 
   
  ##M_MZ is the matrix of moderator scores for MZ twin1 and twin2 
  M_MZ<-cbind(M1_MZ,M2_MZ) 
   
   







   
   
  detach(MZ_ACE) 
  P_MZ<-cbind(P1_MZ,P2_MZ) 
  MZdata<-cbind(M_MZ,P_MZ) 
   
  ####DZs 
  DZ=matrix(c( 
    1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,          #Ac 
    0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,          #Cc 
    0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,          #Ec 
    0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,          #Au 
    0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,          #Cu 
    0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,          #Eu 
    .5,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,          #Ac 
    0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,          #Cc 
    0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,          #Ec 
    0,0,0,.5,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,          #Au 
    0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,          #Cu 
    0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1),12,12,T) #Eu 
   







   
  ##generate latent variable scores 
  ACE_DZ=mvrnorm(N,c(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0),DZ,empirical=T) 
  dimnames(ACE_DZ)[[2]]<-
c("Ac1","Cc1","Ec1","Au1","Cu1","Eu1","Ac2","Cc2","Ec2","Au2","Cu2","Eu2") 
   
  ##model for moderator 
  ACE_DZ<-as.data.frame(ACE_DZ) 
  attach(ACE_DZ) 
  M1_DZ <- Ac1*am + Cc1*cm + Ec1*em 
  M2_DZ <- Ac2*am + Cc2*cm + Ec2*em 
   
  M_DZ=cbind(M1_DZ,M2_DZ) 
   







   
  detach(ACE_DZ) 
  P_DZ<-cbind (P1_DZ,P2_DZ) 
  DZdata<-cbind(M_DZ,P_DZ) 
   
   
  ###data based on P and M 
  MZDZ<-as.data.frame(rbind(MZdata,DZdata)) 
  MZDZ<-rename(MZDZ, c('M1_MZ'='M1','M2_MZ'='M2','P1_MZ'='P1','P2_MZ'='P2')) 
   
   
   
  ######generate data according to GRM 
  params<-cbind(a=c(2.44,1.15,1.93,1.96,2.13,1.09,0.67,1.13,0.87,0.99,1.01,1.63, 
                    1.75,0.80,1.91,0.55,1.06,1.88,0.90,1.94),  
                b1=c(-0.27,-0.21,-0.11,-0.36,0.34,-0.15,0.34,0.23,0.43, 
                     0.04,0.10,0.01,0.37, 0.13,0.00,0.50,-0.24,-0.40,-0.11,-0.24), 
                b2=c(0.84,1.46,1.50,1.29,1.16,1.34,0.99,0.68,0.98,1.22,0.93,0.67,1.49,0.89, 
                     1.29,0.76,1.02,0.80,1.27,0.65), 
                b3=c(2.23,2.01,2.38,2.07,2.07,2.00,2.34,2.33,2.22,2.39,2.27,2.20,2.42,2.29, 
                     2.09,2.32,2.07,2.09,2.27,2.17), 
                b4=c(2.74,2.73,2.82,2.65,2.73,2.78,2.64,2.62,2.83,2.73,2.63, 
                     2.75,2.67,2.92,2.96,2.81,2.74,2.86,2.73,2.73)) 
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  P1<-MZDZ$P1 
  P1<-as.numeric(P1) 
  P1_items<-simIrt(theta=P1, params=params, mod='grm') 
  P1_i<-P1_items$resp 
 
   
   
  P2<-MZDZ$P2 
  P2<-as.numeric(P2) 
  P2_items<-simIrt(theta=P2, params=params, mod='grm') 
  P2_i<-P2_items$resp 
   
   
  ####fit IRT model#### 
  P1_grm<-mirt(data=P1_i, model=1, itemtype='graded') 
  P1_fs<-fscores(P1_grm, method='EAP', full.scores=T, scores.only=T)#, 
response.pattern=P1_i) 
  P1_fs_z<-scale(P1_fs) 
   
   
  P2_grm<-mirt(data=P2_i, model=1, itemtype='graded') 
  P2_fs<-fscores(P2_grm, method='EAP', full.scores=T, scores.only=T)#, 
response.pattern=P1_i) 
  P2_fs_z<-scale(P2_fs) 
   
   
  MZDZ$zyg<-c(rep(1,N),rep(2,N)) 
  
   
  MZDZ_IRT<-cbind(MZDZ$zyg, scale(P1_fs_z), scale(P2_fs_z), MZDZ$M1, MZDZ$M2, 
MZDZ$M1, MZDZ$M2) 
 
  write.table(MZDZ_IRT, file=filenames, col.names=F, row.names=F, sep='  ') 




apply(filenames, 1, make.irt.data) 
 
 
 
